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assigned altitude, the observer will not use that information
in a manner that could be punitive to that crew.
Chapter 4. How to set up a LOSA — US Airways experience 4-5
4.5.4 Some airlines are not as comfortable with the
notion of no-jeopardy. At a minimum, in order to do a
LOSA, an airline should agree that LOSA flight data are
confidential and de-identified. The LOSA forms must not
contain information that could be traced to a specific flight
or crew.
4.5.5 This is not to say that the overall results from an
airline’s LOSA programme should not be publicized. In fact,
once the entire LOSA programme is completed, the airline
is encouraged to share the findings with their pilots.
However, under no circumstances should the results from a
particular flight be divulged or a crew disciplined for
mistakes that occur on a LOSA flight.
The role of the observer
4.5.6 As cited above, the LOSA observer plays a key
role in the effectiveness of a LOSA. If observers are seen
as threats to the career of the pilots being observed, then the
pilots may act differently than if the observers were
perceived as simply being there to collect data to help
improve the airline.
4.5.7 Some airlines use the analogy that the LOSA
observer should be like a “fly on the wall”, meaning that the
observer will not interfere with the crew’s performance.
Observers should create an environment where the crews
hardly realize that they are being observed. It is imperative
that crews do not feel as if they are being given a check-ride.
If an airline uses check airmen and instructors as LOSA
observers, those observers must make a conscious effort to
step out of their typical roles as evaluators. The LOSA
observers must clearly understand that their role is limited
to collecting data, not to disciplining or critiquing crews.
4.6 PROMOTING LOSA FOR
FLIGHT CREWS
Before an airline begins a LOSA, it is highly recommended
that the LOSA be widely publicized. Articles in the
company’s safety publication can go a long way towards
improving line pilot acceptance of a LOSA. There is one
way of publicizing a LOSA that must not be overlooked and
that is a letter that is jointly signed by the company
management and union officials. See Appendix B for an
example.
Copyright  2002 The University of Texas at Austin. All rights reserved. A-1
Appendix A
EXAMPLES OF THE VARIOUS FORMS UTILIZED BY LOSA
LOSA Observation Form — EXAMPLE
Observer Information
Flight Demographics
Crew Demographics
Observer ID (Employee number) 3059
Observation Number #1
Crew Observation Number
(e.g., “1 of 2” indicates segment one for a crew that you observed across two segments) 1 Of 1
City Pairs (e.g., PIT-CLT) PIT - LAX
A/C Type (e.g., 737-300) B-757
Pilot flying (Check one) CA FO X
Time from Pushback to Gate Arrival (Hours:Minutes) 4:55
Late Departure?
(Yes or No) Yes How late?
(Hours:Minutes)
CA FO SO/FE Relief 1 Relief 2
Base PIT PIT
Years experience for all airlines 35 5
Years in position for this A/C 7 1 month
Years in automated A/C
(FMC with VNAV and LNAV) 12 1 month
Crew Familiarity
(Check one)
First LEG the crew has EVER flown together
First DAY the crew has EVER flown together
Crew has flown together before X
SAMPLE
FOR ILLUSTRATION PURPOSES ONLY
A-2 Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA)
Copyright  2002 The University of Texas at Austin. All rights reserved.
Predeparture / Taxi-Out
Narrative
Your narrative should provide a context. What did the crew do well? What did the crew do poorly? How
did the crew perform when confronted with threats, crew errors, and significant events? Also, be sure to
justify your behavioral ratings.
The CA established a great team climate – positive with open communication. However, he seemed
to be in a rush and not very detail oriented. The FO, who was relatively new to the A/C, tried to
keep up but fell behind at times. The CA did not help the cause by interrupting the FO with casual
conversation (“marginal” workload management).
All checklists were rushed and poorly executed. The CA was also lax verifying paperwork. This
sub-par behavior contributed to an undetected error - the FO failed to set his airspeed bugs for
T/O (“poor” monitor/cross-check). The Before Takeoff Checklist should have caught the error, but
the crew unintentionally skipped over that item. During the takeoff roll, the FO noticed the error
and said, “Missed that one.”
　
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