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PM-132A 5-13
SPOILER INDICATIONS
Spoiler extension is indicated at the base of either the SUMRY or FLT
system schematic page on either EICAS or MFD. On the FLT system
schematic display, spoiler extension is presented as a digital display
and as a vertical analog scale with dual points (one for each spoiler).
The digital displays on the SUMRY and FLT pages only show spoiler
extension commanded by autospoilers or with the spoiler lever. They
do not reflect differential extension resulting from operation in
spoileron mode. When the airplane is on the ground with spoilers
extended, a white box will overlay the digital spoiler display. If power
is advanced for takeoff with either or both spoilers extended, this
digital display and box will turn red along with the pointers on the analog
scale. In addition, a red CAS and “CONFIGURATION” voice message
will activate. Spoilers should not be extended at the same time
flaps are extended while in flight except as specified in the Airplane
Flight Manual, or the following CAS message will be posted.
The following CAS illuminations are specific to the spoilers:
The analog scale and pointers are real time showing actual spoiler
position for all conditions. When spoilers are extended as result of
spoileron operation, pointers will indicate their differential on the
analog scale. Digital spoiler indicators and analog scale pointers will
turn amber when flaps are extended 3° or more with spoilers extended.
CAS Color Description
SPOILERS EXT Red The spoilers have moved from the stowed
position, with aircraft on the ground, and
either thrust lever is advanced to MCR or
above.
SPOILERS EXT Amber The aircraft is in flight and spoilers are
extended with flaps extended more than 3°.
SPOILERS EXT White Spoilers are not fully retracted. Spoileron
extension will not activate this CAS (flight and
ground).
Pilot’s Manual
5-14 PM-132A
SPOILER MONITOR SYSTEM
The spoileron computer contains a monitor system to prevent electrical
or mechanical faults from causing uncommanded extension or retraction
of the spoilers. The spoileron computer uses electrical power from
the L ESS BUS for operation and the spoiler indicating system uses
power from the R ESS BUS. The circuits are protected by the SPLR
CTRL and SPLR IND circuit breaker, respectively, located in the
FLIGHT group on the pilot’s and copilot’s circuit breaker panels. If
power to the spoileron computer is lost through the SPLR CTRL or
SPLR IND circuit breaker, the spoilers will retract and be inoperative in
all modes. The spoileron computer performs a self-test (BIT) at powerup.
A test failure will trip the spoileron monitor. If the monitor detects
a self-test failure or a fault during normal operation, hydraulic pressure
is removed from the system by closing the spoiler shutoff valve. A hydraulic
return is provided to blow the spoilers closed. During normal
operation, the shutoff valve is held open by an electrical solenoid. A
power failure will cause this valve to close. If the monitor does not stow
the spoilers, the crew will initiate the stow with either Control Wheel
Master Switch (MSW). When either MSW is held depressed, the spoiler
shutoff valve is depowered closed and the spoilers will blow down;
however, they may not fully retract.
A system malfunction will cause the spoileron monitor to trip and an
amber CAS display. If the malfunction clears, the system may be reset
using the “SPLRN RESET” position on the system test knob. If the monitor
detects a jammed spoiler, the spoileron computer continues to operate
using the spoiler that is not jammed and it applies a full retract
input to the effected actuator for 5 to 7 seconds. This will also illuminate
on the CAS.
The following CAS illuminations are specific to the spoileron monitor:
CAS Color Description
SPOILERS FAIL Amber A failure in the spoiler system is detected.
SPOILER JAM Amber The associated (L or R) spoiler is jammed.
Pilot’s Manual
PM-132A 5-15
PITCH TRIM
Pitch trim is provided by a moveable horizontal stabilizer. Operational
structural redundancy has been incorporated by using primary and
secondary sections that are independent. Primary and secondary each
have electrically and mechanically independent motors (separated for
rotor burst considerations), gear trains, and control inputs. Position
sensors in each section of the actuator, geared directly off of the main
drive screw, are monitored by both IC-600s. The computers compare
the primary position sensors to the secondary position sensors in the
　
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