曝光臺 注意防騙 網(wǎng)曝天貓店富美金盛家居專營店坑蒙拐騙欺詐消費者

receive this SIGMET prior to departure from Kota
Kinabalu as it was issued after the compilation of the
meteorological documents by the local handling agent.
However, pre-departure meteorological information
previously received sufficiently covered the weather
conditions associated with the Tropical Depression.
1.8. Aids to Navigation
There was no report of malfunction on any navigational aids along Route
M754.
18
1.9. ATC and Communications
1.9.1. The accident took place within the Manila FIR when the aircraft
was under the jurisdiction of Manila ATC. At the time of the
occurrence, Manila ATC was operating on 118.9 MHz using 2
transmitters - one transmitter was located in Manila while the other
one was the extended range VHF located in Palawan
(approximately 320 NM southwest of Manila).
1.9.2. According to information provided by Manila ATC, although there
had been no report of moderate or severe turbulence from other
aircraft operated in the vicinity, a number of weather deviations
were recorded. During the outbound flight from Hong Kong to
Kota Kinabalu, HDA061, operated by the same crew, twice
requested weather deviation in the GUKUM – NOBEN area.
(Appendix 7 refers.)
1.9.3. At 0507, HDA060 requested and was given permission by Manila
ATC to deviate 10 NM right of track to avoid weather. At 0510,
shortly after commencing the track deviation, the aircraft
encountered severe turbulence. This was promptly reported to
Manila ATC on VHF 118.9 MHz. At 0554, i.e. 5 minutes prior to
entering Hong Kong FIR, the flight crew reported the severe
turbulence encounter and the injuries sustained by the cabin crew
to Hong Kong ATC. The flight crew also reported the accident to
the company, who subsequently made arrangements for a medical
team to meet the aircraft on arrival. Upon entering Hong Kong
19
FIR, HDA060 was offered priority landing at Hong Kong
International Airport.
1.10. Aerodrome Information
As the occurrence took place during the enroute phase at FL 410, aerodrome
information is considered not relevant to the investigation.
1.11. Flight Recorders
1.11.1. Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR)
1.11.1.1. The aircraft was equipped with an Allied Signal DFDR,
Part Number (PN): 980-4700-003. Data from the
DFDR solid-state memory was successfully retrieved
and decoded shortly after the aircraft landed.
1.11.1.2. The DFDR record showed that just before NOBEN, the
aircraft commenced a 23º right turn, from a heading of
013ºM to a heading of 036ºM. The aircraft was cruising
at FL 410 and at a speed of M 0.81. At 0510:47, the
aircraft encountered the first onset of severe turbulence
that led to a maximum vertical acceleration of 1.89 ‘G’
and a minimum of 0.16 ‘G’. The speed exceeded
M 0.86, which triggered the Vmo/Mmo overspeed
warning. The Autopilot was disconnected and was reengaged
6 seconds later. About 15 seconds after the
first severe turbulence encounter, another encounter
20
resulted in a maximum of 1.27 ‘G’ and a minimum
of - 0.52 ‘G’. During the second turbulence encounter,
the speed varied between M 0.86 and M 0.77. The
pressure altitude varied between 41,628 feet and 40,772
feet. The whole duration of the turbulence encounter
lasted for about 30 seconds. When the Autopilot was
disconnected at the first onset of turbulence, a
momentary elevator angle change from 0º to 7.4º was
recorded. The sidesticks of both pilots remained
neutral at the time.
1.11.2. Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR)
The Honeywell CVR, PN: 980-6020-001, has a recording capacity
of 30 minutes on solid-state memory. As such, voice recording at
the cockpit during the period of the occurrence had been overwritten
well before the aircraft landed. On completion of the flight,
the CVR was removed from the aircraft and voice signal was
retrieved with good playback quality. Subsequent analysis of the
CVR tape revealed that the “Push To Erase” button was activated
at 0658:13 (21 minutes after the aircraft landed), erasing all cockpit
voice recording prior to that point.
1.11.3. Quick Access Recorder (QAR)
The aircraft was fitted with a Penny and Giles QAR system, PN:
D52000-60000. It acquires data directly from ARINC 429 buses
21
and writes the data to an industry standard re-writable Magneto-
Optical (MO) disk with 128 MB capacity. After landing, the
ground engineer attempted to retrieve data from the QAR.
However, retrieval of data for both the Hong Kong – Kota
Kinabalu and Kota Kinabalu – Hong Kong sectors was
　
中國航空網(wǎng) www.k6050.com
航空翻譯 www.aviation.cn
本文鏈接地址：Report on the accident to Airbus A330-342 B-HYA(8)