曝光臺 注意防騙 網曝天貓店富美金盛家居專營店坑蒙拐騙欺詐消費者

AAIU by the Jordanian Authorities. In this he stated that he believed that
he was hit by lateral wind shear after touchdown. He also stated that the
aircraft drifted to the left following the initial touchdown.
1.18.1.2 In another report to the Jordanian Civil Aviation Department the PIC
stated: “ at the time when the a/c lifted off after the (initial) touch down I
spotted the ND (Navigation Display) showing wind speed of 47 kts. That
was the time I believed that I was hit by wind shear at the touch down”.
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1.18.1.3 The PIC also stated that he had received simulator wind shear training, but
he had not seen what happened in the Shannon landing before.
1.18.1.4 In a response to the draft report the PIC stated that having taken control of
the aircraft, he was not under pressure to complete the approach.
1.18.2 Inertial Reference System (IRS)
1.18.2.1 The IRS units are used to provide aircraft ground speed and track. Their
output is used in the calculation of wind speed and direction.
1.18.2.2 During the final repair of the aircraft at Toulouse, after the accident, the
Inertial Reference Units (P/N HG1050BD02 S/N 447, P/N HG1050BD02
S/N 448 and P/N HG1050BD05 S/N 94080827 were found to be defective.
Examination of the aircraft technical records and the reliability printout did
not show any indications of IRS defects prior to the heavy landing at
Shannon.
1.18.3 Flight Crew Operating Manual (FCOM)
1.18.3.3 The FCOM lays down the action to be taken in the event of a bounce on
landing. If a high bounce is encountered, the required action is to abandon
the landing and initiate a go-round. If the bounce is not sufficiently high to
require the initiation of a go-round, the aircraft pitch attitude should be
maintained until the aircraft settles back onto the runway.
1.19 Useful on Effective Investigation Techniques
Nil
2 ANALYSIS
2.1 The Approach
2.1.1 The weather radar recordings and the pilots’ observations show that the
aircraft passed close to areas of CB activity during the approach. This
resulted in moderate turbulence in the approach, in particular above
1000 ft.
2.1.2 The turbulence continued to near ground level, but at a reduced intensity.
2.1.3 The PIC took control in order to avoid the CB cell to the left of the aircraft.
As a result, he had to manoeuvre the aircraft in a more demanding manner
than required by a standard approach in order to subsequently capture the
ILS. This would have contributed to an initial destabilisation of the
approach.
2.1.4 The turbulence and light wind shear conditions encountered during the
approach made the task of stabilising the approach more difficult.
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2.1.5 The aircraft was not stabilised on the glideslope at several stages of the
approach.
2.1.6 Below 1000 ft, the aircraft was considerably above the glide slope. When
at 300 ft., the aircraft was significantly below the glideslope. The recovery
from the high position resulted in a high rate of descent in the later phase
of the approach, followed by a late flare with increased engine power and a
fast touch-down at 20 kts above Vref.
2.2 The landing
2.2.1 As a consequence of the unstable approach, the initial touchdown was a
hard landing followed by a bounce.
2.2.2 The large input of nose down elevator input during the bounce resulted in a
heavy landing in a nose down attitude on the second touchdown. The
initial impact of this second touchdown was therefore absorbed by the nose
wheel, with consequent damage to the aircraft structure in the area of the
nose wheel.
2.2.3 The action of the PIC in applying nose down elevator during the bounce
was contrary to the procedures laid down in the aircraft’s FCOM.
2.2.4 The ground spoilers closed automatically during the bounce because the
throttles were advanced above flight idle.
2.2.5 A high lateral G of 0.32 was recorded at point touchdown. This was
probably caused by combination of right wing down 3° and 4° left rudder,
and a heading 4° left of the runway heading at touchdown.
2.2.6 The drift to the left following the initial touchdown, as subsequently
reported by the PIC, was probably caused by the combination of left
heading and left rudder at the initial touchdown. The evidence from the
aircraft’s system and the anemometer shows that the wind throughout the
landing was from the left and therefore could not have caused the aircraft
to drift to the left.
2.2.7 The 47 kts head wind recorded by the avionic systems on JY-AGK
occurred about 30 seconds after the initial touchdown, when the airspeed
was less than 90 kts. The Shannon Anemometer did not record a wind
　
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