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It is also possible for an organisation (or individual) to proclaim itself as the Certificate Au-thority and begin to issue certificates. The only natural condition is that a community of users exists who trusts it (him/her) as a CA. Open Source (free) software as well as commercial software are available to manage a CA and issue certificates.
These techniques are being used, for example, in the European AIS Database (EAD) project. EAD's system-to-system interface is based on the exchange of XML messages, which are signed by the originator for authentication.
Chapter 9. eAIP Security Risks and Mitigation Strategies
9.1. Introduction
9.1.1. Scope
Security risks discussed in this chapter concern the transmission of the eAIP, from an AIS office, to the AIP end-user. The following areas are not covered:
.  
the creation and edition of an eAIP (covered by the AIS quality assurance process),

.  
the use of the eAIP (relevant to the end-user internal safety/security policy and covered by specific regulations).

It is assumed that the data contained in an eAIP is non-confidential and that it does not need to be modified during transport. A user must be able to notice if it has been modified between publication and usage.
9.1.2. Overview
Publishing an electronic AIP introduces a variety of risks: the publication, transmission and use of the eAIP could take place over several untrusted networks, such as the Internet. To reduce the risk of data tampering and data loss, the use of electronic signatures is recommen-
ded.
9.1.3. Disclaimer
Most software mentioned in relation with the eAIP Specification is Open Source and Free Software. This software environment is not intended for production use, but rather to facil-itate the adoption of and experimentation with public key technology. It is up to the interested organisation to select software, open or closed source, to fulfil the goals of eAIP security.
These documents do not contain guidelines for internal security policy, or any other inform-ation necessary for the set-up and operation of a production-quality Certificate Authority (CA) or PGP-based security infrastructure.
The security implications of operating any cryptographic technology, legal ramifications and other issues are outside the scope of this document. Interested parties should consider seeking professional help from security experts if they don't have adequate knowledge internally.
9.2. Risk Classification
For each identified risk below, a risk classification table is included. It describes the risk, its likelihood, and its impact on the parties involved. The table is structured as follows:
Table 9.1.

Type: What kind of risk is it?
.
Impersonation: the end-user believes the attacker is a legitimate person

.
Data Integrity: the content of the eAIP is modified or destroyed

.
Availability: the eAIP is not available to the end-users

Impact of risk: What is the impact level to the sending and/or receiving party?

.
High: severe impact on safety

.
Medium: some minor impacts

.
Low: no impacts on safety

Difficulty: How easy is it to achieve or how likely is it to happen?

.
Easy: unskilled hacker / short time / very likely

.
Difficult: confirmed hacker / medium time frame / likely

.
Very difficult: well equipped and confirmed hacker / long time frame / unlikely

9.3. Risks
9.3.1. Introduction
The following risks have been identified:
.
Download Server Tampering

.
Download Server Denial of Service

.
Download Server Hijacking

.
Email impersonation

.
Media interception

.
Data corruption

Please note that this list is not exhaustive.
9.3.2. Download Server Tampering
　
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