曝光臺(tái) 注意防騙 網(wǎng)曝天貓店富美金盛家居專營(yíng)店坑蒙拐騙欺詐消費(fèi)者

of the patch repair was concluded to be the result of impact. Examination of the patch
revealed no evidence of material or workmanship abnormalities.
Therefore the possibility that the patch repair was a factor contributing to the accident can
be ruled out.
2.9 General Operational Issues
Both pilots were properly trained, qualified and licensed to conduct the flight in
accordance with the Singapore Air Navigation Order. The pilots received sufficient rest
before the flight and had no medical history that would adversely affect their
performance.
The security checks of passengers, baggage and cargo were conducted in accordance with
standard procedures. The results of the checks were all normal. No dangerous goods were
carried on board.
The aircraft was dispatched and operated within the certified weight and balance limits.
At the time of the accident it was daylight. Weather observations around Palembang
indicated no adverse weather in the vicinity near that time. There were several flights in
the vicinity at different flight levels and the en-route weather experienced by these flights
was isolated in nature. Generally, flights that were affected by the weather would have
requested for deviation before the flight encountered the weather. The Sempati 134 flight
38
from Jakarta to Batam flying at FL310 approximately 2 minutes ahead of MI 185 reported
that due to weather conditions en-route he requested to fly direct PARDI. The Qantas 41
flight at FL410 about 8 minutes behind MI 185 did not report adverse weather over
Palembang except for two or three isolated thunderstorms about ten miles to the east of
track near Palembang.
All navigational aids and facilities of the Jakarta airport, and other en-route navigation
aids between Jakarta and Singapore were fully serviceable. The flight was cleared to route
from a point near Jakarta direct to Palembang, then to PARDI.
Up to 09:10:26 the Jakarta Air Traffic Controller was communicating normally with the
cockpit crew on frequency 132.70 MHz. From then on, no distress call was received from
the crew, no distress signal was received from the aircraft transponder, and no emergency
locator beacon transmissions were detected from the crash site.
2.10 Simulated Descent Profile
The last five ATC radar points recorded represent the flight trajectory of the aircraft from
the cruise altitude 35,000 feet to approximately 19,500 feet. Each point consisted of data
relating to time, altitude and geographical coordinates.
Simulator tests and computer simulation fly-out studies were done to determine failures
or combination of failures of the flight control and autopilot systems that could result in
the extreme descent trajectory. Aircraft flight data were not available for the time period
after the stoppage of the FDR. The initial condition for these tests and studies was cruise
configuration at 35,000 feet based on the last known FDR data. The altitude range for the
simulations was from 35,000 feet to approximately 19,500 feet.
The results of these simulation studies (Appendix G) are summarized as follows:
• Any single failure of the primary flight controls such as hard-over or jamming of
aileron, rudder or elevator did not result in a descent time history similar to that of the
last ATC radar points. In simulations of these flight control failure conditions the
aircraft could be recovered to normal flight manually.
• Any single failure of the secondary flight controls such as hard over or jamming of
yaw damper, or runaway of the stabilizer trim would not result in a descent time
history similar to that of the last ATC radar points. In simulations of these flight
control failure conditions the aircraft could be recovered to normal flight manually.
• Manipulation of the primary flight controls without horizontal stabilizer trim would
result in a descent time history similar to that of the last ATC radar points. But this
required large control column input forces and the aircraft was subjected to a loading
exceeding 2 G. However, if the control column input forces were relaxed, in the
simulations the aircraft would recover from the steep descent due to its inherent
stability.
• Among other possibilities, a combination of changing the stabilizer trim from about
4.5 to 2.5 units and an aileron input could result in a descent time history similar to
39
that of the last ATC radar points. This simulated descent trajectory would result in the
aircraft entering an accelerating spiral and being subjected to a loading of less than 2
G. Furthermore, the aircraft would continue in the spiral even when the control forces
were relaxed. This would result in a descent at a speed exceeding 1.2 Vd, in
　
中國(guó)航空網(wǎng) www.k6050.com
航空翻譯 www.aviation.cn
本文鏈接地址：NTSC Aircraft Accident Report SILKAIR FLIGHT MI 185 BOEING B(27)