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and proud of his flying skills and was very proud of his RSAF experience.
The captain was described as motivated to obtain the best for himself and it
was reported that his career was important to him.
The HPG did find through interviews that there were no reports of the
captain having any unusual or abnormal personal habits in the cockpit
during flights and that it was routine for him to leave the cockpit to use the
toilet, get a drink, or chat with the flight attendants.
The relationships between the captain and the three management pilots in
SilkAir were reported to be quite cordial. It was reported that when he
joined the company, management regarded him as a pilot who would have
no trouble reaching a command position and who had the potential to
become a management pilot. The managers were impressed with the
captain’s performance during his time as a first officer and as a captain.
HPG interviews revealed that during this period, the captain often visited
the Flight Operations Manager or the B737 Fleet Manager to offer
suggestions to improve the company’s operations. However, following the
incidents and subsequent investigations in 1997, the captain’s relationship
with the B737 Fleet Manager became less amicable. Although there were no
reported arguments, there was little interaction between them. The captain
continued to visit and communicate with the Flight Operations Manager but
this relationship became somewhat strained after the captain lost his LIP
status.
The captain was well respected by other Singaporean pilots in the
company, was one of the first two Singaporeans to join SilkAir, and was
one of the first two Singaporeans to be selected for command training. As
such, he was regarded as a natural leader to the Singaporeans who
subsequently joined the airline. The captain was one of several pilots
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who were involved in efforts to improve the employment conditions of
Singaporean pilots. He was also known to defend other Singaporean pilots
or encourage them to question any unfair treatment.
During the accident investigation, the HPG received reports that the captain
did not have a good relationship with some of the expatriate pilots in the
airline. Some of the pilots stated that the captain did not accept advice or
criticism well from other captains. Further, some pilots also stated that that
the captain had been promoted to LIP over more experienced captains who
had airline instructional experience before coming to SilkAir. The Flight
Operations Manager said that the captain was promoted because he had
previous training experience in the RSAF, had a good record, and had all the
markings of a good instructor. It was also stated that because he was
Singaporean, he was preferred over expatriates.
The captain was generally popular among flight attendants and it was
reported that he was typically easy-going and often joked with them. He
never made any special demands, and he often completed sectors faster than
other captains. Flight dispatchers also reported that the captain was easygoing
and sociable. Line engineers reported that the captain was friendly,
helped when there were engineering problems, and was quite reasonable
about accepting any defects.
The HPG also received reports during its investigation that during the latter part of
1997, the captain criticized or complained about SilkAir management and the B737
Fleet Manager during flights. It was reported that he appeared to be upset about
the inquiries that had taken place and his loss of LIP status and that he believed he
had been unfairly treated. However, there were also reports that the captain had
accepted his demotion.
It is also suggested that the appropriate section of NTSC draft Final Report be
revised to include the information regarding the captain’s use of medical leave to
demonstrate a change in his behavior in the 3 months before the accident. For
example, during his 6-year career at SilkAir, the captain visited the airline’s
preferred medical group on 31 occasions. No major, excessive, or extra-ordinary
medical problems were ever reported or noted. The PIC submitted six medical
certificates, each requiring a day off flying duties during his SilkAir career. These
occurred on August 1, 1995, July 23, 1996, August 10, 1997, October 1, 1997, and
November 12 and 24, 1997. All certificates were associated with temporary
conditions such as upper-respiratory tract infection, flu, or gastroenteritis.
As previously stated, a section describing the first officer’s behavioral
characteristics should be added to the draft Final Report. This section should
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precede “section 1.18.4.3 Recent Behaviour” in the draft Final Report (thereby
　
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