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Centre that SANTA MARIA had no information about the flight.
At 6 h 35, the MADRID centre told the BREST centre that the flight was at that
time in contact with CASABLANCA FIR and would enter the LISBOA FIR within
a quarter of an hour. The BREST centre transmitted this information to the
Air France Operations Control Centre and to the Cinq Mars La Pile Regional
Control Centre.
At 6 h 44, after having contacted the CASABLANCA control centre, the Air
France OCC called the BREST centre and informed it that CASABLANCA did
not have contact (either by radio or radar) with the flight. The OCC specified
that the CASABLANCA centre was in contact with AF459.
At 6 h 45, the BREST centre transmitted this information to the MADRID centre.
At 6 h 51, the MADRID centre confirmed that LISBOA had no radar contact and
that CASABLANCA had neither radio nor radar contact with flight AF447. It
specified that the flight should enter LISBOA airspace within ten minutes and
then establish radar contact.
At 7 h 08, the MADRID centre informed the BREST centre that LISBOA had no
radio or radar contact with AF447.
At 7 h 17, the BREST centre, which was then trying to locate flight AF447
in oceanic airspace, directly contacted the SANTA MARIA centre. The latter
indicated that the DAKAR centre had had no contact with flight AF447 and that
it was then supposed to be with the CASABLANCA centre. The BREST centre
confirmed to SANTA MARIA that the CASABLANCA centre had no contact with
flight AFR447. The SANTA MARIA centre then sought information from the
CANARIAS centre.
At 7 h 29, the Air France OCC called the BREST centre to express its concerns
over AF447. It stated that the airplane was not in contact either with Brazil
or with Senegal and that the attempts at communication using the ACARS
system, SATCOM and Stockholm radio were unsuccessful.
F-GZCP - 1st June 2009
44
Note: Stockholm radio is a private operator based in Sweden that offers HF radio
communications services. Air France is a client of Stockholm radio.
At 7 h 37, BREST called SANTA MARIA again, and the latter informed it that
it had not had radar contact with AF447. SANTA MARIA added that DAKAR
had coordinated AF447 with SAL but that the latter had had no radio or radar
contact with the flight.
At 7 h 41, the DAKAR shift supervisor informed the Dakar Rescue Control
Centre that flight AF447 should have passed the TASIL point at 2 h 20 but that
it had not had any contact with the plane.
Shortly afterwards, the Air France OCC and then the BREST centre informed
the BEA. The BREST centre planned to launch an alert phase at the forecast
time of entry of the plane into the BREST UIR.
At 8 h 01, the BREST centre informed the Cinq Mars La Pile Regional Control
Centre that it still had no news of flight AF447 and wondered whether it would
be appropriate to launch an alert. The Cinq Mars La Pile Regional Control
Centre said that it was not qualified to intervene since the event was outside
its SAR responsibility zone.
At 8 h 07, the LISBOA and SANTA MARIA centres replied to the BREST centre
saying that they had no news of flight AF447.
At 8 h 15, the MADRID centre launched an INCERFA-ALERFA phase.
At 8 h 34, the BREST centre launched a DETRESFA phase and called the Cinq
Mars La Pile Regional Control Centre.
At 8 h 37, the air traffic control services at Paris Charles de Gaulle airport asked
their counterparts in Dakar for information on flight AF447.
At 9 h 09, the BREST centre sent a DETRESFA message to some centres along the
route of flight AF447. The message indicated an estimated position between
the ORARO and TASIL report points.
At 9 h 31, the SAL centre, which was not the recipient of the message from
BREST, sent an ALERFA-INCERFA message to the DAKAR centre.
At 9 h 40, the Dakar rescue control centre informed the Dassault Atlantique
detachment that the control centre had not had contact with a plane that
should have crossed the DAKAR OCEANIC FIR. The head of the Naval Aviation
detachment contacted the military authorities in France: the Brest Maritime
Operations Centre, the National Air Operations Centre (CNOA) and the Gris
Nez centre(15).
At 9 h 50, the head of the Naval Aviation detachment launched a heightened
alert (one hour notice and additional fuelling carried out).
At 10 h 45, the Dakar rescue control centre gave the takeoff order to the Dassault
Atlantique 2 to position itself at Cape Verde. This was a pre-positioning choice
given the uncertainty about the location of the accident.
(15)Gris-Nez is
the French
correspondent
of the foreign
search and
rescue centres. It
centralizes and
　
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本文鏈接地址：Interim report on the accident on 1st June 2009 to the Airbu(15)