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網曝天貓店富美金盛家居專營店坑蒙拐騙欺詐消費者
investigation, the following facts have been established:
the crew possessed the licenses and ratings required to undertake the
flight,
the airplane possessed a valid Certificate of Airworthiness, and had been
maintained in accordance with the regulations,
the airplane had taken off from Rio de Janeiro without any known technical
problems, except on one of the three radio handling panels,
no problems were indicated by the crew to Air France or during contacts
with the Brazilian controllers,
no distress messages were received by the control centres or by other
airplanes,
there were no satellite telephone communications between the airplane
and the ground,
the last radio exchange between the crew and Brazilian ATC occurred at
1 h 35 min 15 s. The airplane arrived at the edge of radar range of the
Brazilian control centres,
at 2 h 01, the crew tried, without success for the third time, to connect to
the Dakar ATC ADS-C system,
up to the last automatic position point, received at 2 h 10 min 35 s, the
flight had followed the route indicated in the flight plan,
the meteorological situation was typical of that encountered in the month
of June in the inter-tropical convergence zone,
there were powerful cumulonimbus clusters on the route of AF447. Some
of them could have been the centre of some notable turbulence,
several airplanes that were flying before and after AF 447, at about the
same altitude, altered their routes in order to avoid cloud masses,
twenty-four automatic maintenance messages were received between
2 h 10 and 2 h 15 via the ACARS system. These messages show inconsistency
between the measured speeds as well as the associated consequences,
before 2 h 10, no maintenance messages had been received from AF 447,
with the exception of two messages relating to the configuration of the
toilets,
the operator’s and the manufacturer’s procedures mention actions to be
undertaken by the crew when they have doubts as to the speed indications,
the last ACARS message was received towards 2 h 14 min 28 s,
the flight was not transferred between the Brazilian and Senegalese control
centres,
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between 8 h and 8 h 30, the first emergency alert messages were sent by
the Madrid and Brest control centres,
the first bodies and airplane parts were found on 6 June,
the elements identified came from all areas of the airplane,
visual examination showed that the airplane was not destroyed in flight;
it appears to have struck the surface of the sea in level flight with high
vertical acceleration.
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73
List of Appendices
Appendix 1
Meteorological study undertaken by Météo France
Appendix 2
TEMSI SOUTH AMERICA chart for 1st June at 0 h 00 between FL 250 and 630
Appendix 3
Transcript of radio communications concerning flight AF447
Appendix 4
Chronology of recovery of bodies and airplane parts
Appendix 5
Reference of procedures associated with some ECAM messages
Appendix 6
ATC flight plan supplied by Air France
Appendix 7
Study of route dossiers and associated fuel
Appendix 8
Extract from Air France manual on fuel policy
Appendix 9
Procedure for flight with unreliable IAS / ADR check
F-GZCP - 1st June 2009
75
Appendix 1
Meteorological study undertaken by Météo France
Meteorological situation in the tropical atlantic on 1st june 2009
1. General situation
1.1. On the surface of the ocean
1.2. Wind field of lower and mid-altitude layers
1.3. Wind field at altitude
1.4. Evaluation of the tropopause
2. Description of the Inter-tropical Convergence Zone on 1st June 2009
2.1. Position of the Inter-tropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ)
2.2. Storm activity in the ITCZ characterised by météosat 9 infrared
2.2.1. Phenomenology: cumulonimbus and associated phenomena,
storm clusters
2.2.2. Advantages and limitations of geostationary infrared imagery
2.2.3. Analysis of the storm activity in the ITCZ over four days (from
30 May to 3 June 2009)
2.3. Analysis of the cluster located on the planned route
2.3.1. Evolution observed between 0 h 00 and 3 h 00
2.3.2. Detailed analysis of the image taken at 2 h 07
2.3.3. Analysis based on “Rapid Developing Thunderstorm”
processing
2.3.4. Summary
2.4. Observations by an aircraft equipped with the AMDAR system
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本文鏈接地址：Interim report on the accident on 1st June 2009 to the Airbu(28)
