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1.6.2  System description, Requirements and Hazard Identification
1.6.2.1  This should contain the reason for and an overview of, the proposal and intended changes, together with an identification of the safety objectives and regulatory requirements, which must be satisfied, including identification of approval under the ANO.
1.6.2.2  A description of the operational and functional requirements should be included to define why the change is needed and what the end result should be.
1.6.2.3  A risk assessment should be carried out to identify hazards associated with the change and assess their impact. This may result in additional safety requirements which will remove or mitigate the identified hazards. This process may need to be repeated at a later stage if the design solution does not satisfy all requirements that have been identified.
1.6.2.4  Any assumptions that have been made should be clearly stated and justified.
1.6.2.5  It should be clearly stated who is responsible for the management and implementation of the change to current operations.
1.6.3  Justification of selected system or operational change
1.6.3.1  It should be demonstrated how the selected solution to the required change will meet the identified safety, operational, legislative and functional requirements, during installation, commissioning and operational deployment.
1.6.3.2  This may include a high level overview of the new system with lower level detail examining safety related areas of design. The justification should consider any features of the design which are not included in the operational or functional requirements but may still affect system safety. Any such features will need to be mitigated, for example, by disabling a feature or instituting a procedure to preclude the feature being invoked.
1.6.3.3  In many cases, it will be necessary for the service provider to obtain assurance from equipment suppliers that any assumptions that have been made are valid. Reference should be made to pertinent sections of CAP 670, particularly when seeking assurances involving software or system installations.
1.6.3.4  Any identified safety requirements that cannot be satisfied by the selected solution should be clearly described and mitigated as appropriate, in the safety documentation.
1.6.4  Physical integration and Handover into Routine Operation
1.6.4.1  The safety assurance documentation should describe how the change will be safely integrated into current operations. Any risks introduced by integrating the new system should be identified and mitigation arguments presented.
1.6.4.2  Assurance that all staff, including contractors, involved in the change, are competent to perform their task, should be provided. The documentation should describe any operational training and familiarisation which is required and provide assurance that it will have taken place prior to introduction to service.
1.6.4.3  Operational and support procedures necessary during the introduction of the change should be described. In many cases it may be necessary to include reversion procedures to be followed if some unforeseen problem prevents the change being completed.
1.6.4.4  The documentation should include a summary showing that all hazards identified in the safety assessment have been addressed and that the system will be safe for operational use.
1.6.4.5  The safety assurance documentation should provide a description of the steps to be taken during Operational deployment or handover of the change and those required for its continued operation. This should include the satisfactory completion and recording of any test results.
1.6.4.6  This should also include a description of any engineering, maintenance, support or operational tasks. It should be demonstrated that any instructions to be followed by ATS staff will provide sufficient guidance for safe operation.
　
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本文鏈接地址：CAP 670 Air Traffic Services Safety Requirements 1(48)