Require the use of safety risk analyses to evaluate existing operational procedures at airports where FAA has identified potential runway safety risks and train personnel in conducting such analysis.
FAA Order JO 7050.1 has been revised to require this and is currently in the process of coordination.
Require each line of business to include quantitative goals in its annual business plan for reducing runway incursion risks that are specific to its oversight responsibilities and designate the Office of Runway Safety as the authority to review and approve all runway safety initiatives submitted by all lines of business.
The annual business plans of the individual lines of business as well as the FAA Flight Plan reflect runway safety initiatives from this plan.

NTSB Recommendations

Require, at all airports with scheduled passenger service, a ground movement safety system that will prevent runway incursions; the system should provide a direct warning capability to flight crews. In addition, demonstrate through computer simulations or other means that the system will, in fact, prevent incursions.
The FAA is exploring the use of a variety of products with direct warning capability including Electronic Flight Bags with Moving Map Displays showing own ship position, systems capable of giving aural alerts of own ship proximity to runways while landing or taxiing, systems capable of vehicle location and tracking and systems capable of incursion prediction and warning that require integration with surface surveillance systems.
Amend 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) section 91.129(I) to require that all runway crossings be authorized only by specific air traffic control clearance, and ensure that U.S. pilots, U.S. personnel assigned to move aircraft and pilots operating under 14 CFR Part 129 receive adequate notification of the change. 
A Safety Risk Management Document (SRMD) for explicit runway crossing clearances was completed on January 7, 2008. During the review process it was determined that the panel did not address all hazards pertaining to this change. The SRM panel held a telecom to address the additional hazard. The updated SRMD was prepared and has been sent back for review. Once this SRMD is approved, Terminal Services will send a request to begin the rule making process. This could take up to two years to complete. The panel plans to hold a telecom to discuss making a change to FAA Order 7110.65 while rule-making is ongoing to require a clearance for each runway crossing. If no high risk is identified, implementation could occur as soon as October 2008.
Amend FAA Order 7110.65, “Air Traffic Control,” to require that, when aircraft need to cross multiple runways, air traffic controllers issue an explicit crossing instruction for each runway after the aircraft has crossed the previous runway.
The Runway to Runway SRMD was completed and sent for review. The SRM panel believed this change needed to take place after the explicit runway crossing clearances change and if the change were not accomplished in this sequence a high risk would be introduced into the NAS. The panel also believed that some airports have a need to cross multiple runways with one clearance. The panel suggested a taxi study be completed by Flight Standards and Human Factors to help determine a safe distance that could be allowed when crossing multiple runways with a single clearance. During the SRMD review process questions were raised about the study. Human Factors, Terminal Services, Office of Safety and AOV met to address the study and the modeling methods to be employed. Terminal Services has since decided to solicit impact statements from field facilities. The panel will meet again to review the field input, determine allowed distance for multiple crossings and prepare a revision to the SRMD.
　
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本文鏈接地址：National Runway Safety Plan 2009-2011(31)