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efforts,
including assignment of the system safety requirements to internal organizations and subcontractors,
coordination of subcontractor SSPs, integration of hazard analysis, program status reporting, and SSWGs.
The process by which contractor management decisions will be made,
including timely notification of unacceptable risks, necessary action, accidents or malfunctions, waivers
to safety requirements, and program deviations.
The contractor must provide a description of a system safety function with a management authority, as the
agent of the program manager, to maintain a continual overview of the technical and planning aspects of
the total program. Although the specific organizational assignment of this function is a contractor's
responsibility, the plan must show a direct accountability to the program manager with unrestricted access
to any level of management to be acceptable.
The ultimate responsibility for all decisions relating to the conduct and implementation of the SSP rests
with the program director or manager. Each element manager is expected to be fully accountable for the
implementation of safety requirements in the respective area of responsibility.
In the usual performance of their duties, SSP managers must have direct approval authority over any
safety critical program documentation, design, procedures, or procedural operation. A log of nondeliverable
data should be maintained showing all program documentation reviewed, concurrence or nonFAA
System Safety Handbook, Chapter 5: Post-Investment Decision Safety Activities
December 30, 2000
5 - 11
concurrence, reasons why the system safety engineer concurs or non-concurs, and actions taken as a result
of non-concurrence. The MA should assess activity and progress by reviewing this log.
For major programs, the staffing forecast can be provided at the significant safety task level.
The contractor is required to assign a system safety manager who meets specific educational and
professional requirements and who has had significant assignments in the professional practice of safety.
Qualifications should reflect the system's criticality and SSP magnitude. Application of common sense is
necessary. Clearly, the safety manager for an airframe program requires different credentials than one
responsible for an avionics program. For major programs, a range of six to nine years of system safety
experience is required. In some cases, it is justifiable to require either a registered Professional Engineer
(PE) or a board Certified Safety Professional
In other cases, work experience may be substituted for educational requirements. Small programs or
organizations may have limited access to personnel with full time safety experience, and the MA should
be confident that such credentials are necessary for the specific application before invoking them.
The minimum qualifications for the systems safety manager or staff should be included in the contract.
This may be difficult: The existence of a CSP is a rarity at electronic development and manufacturing
companies. If a CSP is required, the contractor is likely to hire a part-time CSP consultant, a questionable
approach. PEs are more common, but few have careers involving safety. Appendix A in MIL-STD-882
provides a table of minimum qualifications for programs based upon complexity and demands on CSP or
PE qualifications. This approach ignores the hazard severity of the system.
Table 5-2 is suggested as a qualification baseline. It is not absolute and is offered only as guidance. The
MA may adjust these qualifications, as appropriate.
5.3.3 Program Milestones
To be effective, the system safety activities on any program must be integrated into other program
activities. To be efficient, each SSP task must be carefully scheduled to have the most positive effect. A
safety analysis performed early in the design process can lead to the inexpensive elimination of a hazard
through design changes. The later the hazard is identified in the design cycle, the more expensive and
difficult the change. Hazards identified in T&E production, or following deployment may be impractical
to change. In such cases, hazards may still be controlled through procedural and training steps but having
to do so, when they could have been prevented, reflects unnecessary long-term costs and risk.
FAA System Safety Handbook, Chapter 5: Post-Investment Decision Safety Activities
December 30, 2000
5 - 12
Table 5-2: Key Personnel Systems Safety Qualifications
Program
Complexity
Program
Severity
Education
Experience
Certification
High Catastrophic BS in Engineering or
applicable other
Six years in system
safety
CSP or PE
　
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