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(LOB) is required to establish and implement the policy contained within Order 8040.4 consistent with that
office’s role in the FAA. While the methods and documentation requirements are left to the program office’s
discretion, each is required to satisfy the following criteria:
Plan: The safety risk management process shall be predetermined, documented in a plan that must include the criteria
for acceptable risk.
Hazard identification: The hazard analyses and assessments required in the plan shall identify the safety risks
associated with the system or operations under evaluation.
Analysis: The risks shall be characterized in terms of severity of consequence and likelihood of occurrence in
accordance with the plan.
Comparative Safety Assessment: The Comparative Safety Assessment of the hazards examined shall be compared to
the acceptability criteria specified in the plan and the results provided in a manner and method easily adapted for
decision making.
Decision: The risk management decision shall include the safety Comparative Safety Assessment. Comparative Safety
Assessments may be used to compare and contrast options.
The order permits quantitative or qualitative assessments, but states a preference for quantitative. It requires
the assessments, to the maximum extent feasible, to be scientifically objective, unbiased, and inclusive of all
relevant data. Assumptions shall be avoided when feasible, but when unavoidable they shall be conservative
and the basis for the assumption shall be clearly identified. As a decision tool, the Comparative Safety
Assessment should be related to current risks and should compare the risks of various alternatives when
applicable.
In addition, the order requires each LOB or program office to plan the following for each high-consequence
decision:
Perform and provide a Comparative Safety Assessment that compares each alternative considered (including no action
or change, or baseline) for the purpose of ranking the alternatives for decision making.
Assess the costs and safety risk reduction or increase (or other benefits) associated with each alternative under final
consideration.
Safety Risk Management Committee
The SRMC is established by the Order to provide guidance to the program offices or LOBs, when requested,
on planning, organizing, and implementing Order 8040.4. The SRMC consists of technical experts in safety
risk management, with representation from each Associate/Assistant Administrator and the Offices of the
Chief Counsel, Civil Rights, Government and Industry Affairs, and Public Affairs.
FAA System Safety Handbook, Chapter 2: System Safety Policy and Process
December 30, 2000
2- 3
2.1.2 AMS Policies
The AMS policy contains the following paragraphs in 2.9.13:
System Safety Management shall be conducted and documented throughout the acquisition management lifecycle.
Critical safety issues identified during mission analysis are recorded in the Mission Need Statement; a system safety
assessment of candidate solutions to mission need is reported in the Investment Analysis Report; and Integrated Product
Teams provide for program-specific safety risk management planning in the Acquisition Strategy Paper.
Each line of business involved in acquisition management must institute a system safety management process that
includes at a minimum: hazard identification, hazard classification (severity of consequences and likelihood of
occurrence), measures to mitigate hazards or reduce risk to an acceptable level, verification that mitigation measures are
incorporated into product design and implementation, and assessment of residual risk. Status of System Safety shall be
presented at all Joint Resources Council (JRC) meetings. Detailed guidelines for system safety management are found
in the FAST.
2.2 The FAA Safety Risk Management Process
The FAA Safety Risk Management process is designed to evaluate safety risk throughout the National
Airspace System (NAS) life cycle. The primary focus of this process is to identify, evaluate, and control
safety risk in the NAS. Each LOB or program office has unique responsibilities in the NAS. As a reflection
of these responsibilities, the safety risk management program and the associated assessment tools/techniques
used by each office will be different from the other LOBs. The overall approach will remain the same: early
identification and control of those hazards that create the greatest risk within the NAS. The following
paragraphs summarize each office’s approach to system safety risk management.
The safety risk management process operates as an integral part of the AMS under the oversight of the FAA
System Engineering Council. Figure 2-1 depicts the AMS Integrated Product Development System (IPDS)
　
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