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serve as a basis for other future analyses.
The basis of the analysis relates to generic hazards and controls to specific maintenance steps required for
maintaining and repairing the system. The maintenance steps identified during the review should be
integrated into a matrix. In evaluating hazards associated with the maintenance procedures, the specific
procedures could fall into generic maintenance categories, which are characterized for example as listed
below:
·  Transporting line replaceable units (LRU)
·  Processor shut down procedures
·  Energizing and de-energizing procedures
·  Connection and disconnection procedures
·  Mounting and unmounting procedures
·  Restart procedures
The anticipated hazards associated with the maintenance steps and comments could be presented in a Risk
Assessment Matrix (Master Matrix). Generic hazard controls should be identified using a Requirements
Cross-check Analysis. The anticipated hazards should be verified by on-site reviews.
12.5 Analytical Techniques
The analytical techniques associated with facility system safety are the same techniques applied in the
system safety discipline. However, discussions are provided to highlight the concepts of facility system
safety, operational risk management, and safety, health, and environmental considerations.
FAA System Safety Handbook, Chapter 12: Facilities Safety
December 30, 2000
12 - 14
12.5.1 Change Analysis1
Change analysis examines the potential affects of modifications to existing systems from a starting point or
baseline. The change analysis systematically hypothesizes worse case effects from each modification from
that baseline. Consider existing, known system as a baseline. Examine the nature of all contemplated
changes and analyze the potential effects of each change (singularly) and all changes (collectively) upon
system risks. The process often requires the use of a system walk down, which is the method of physically
examining the system or facility to identify the current configuration.
Alternatively, a change analysis could be initiated on an existing facility by comparing “as designed” with
the “as built” configuration. In order to accomplish this, there would first be the need to physically identify
the differences from the “as designed” configuration. The process steps are:
·  Identify system baseline
·  Identify changes
·  Examine each baseline change by postulated effects
·  Determine collective/interactive/interface effects
·  Conclude system risk or deviation from baseline risk
·  Report findings
12.5.2 Preliminary Hazard List (PHL)
The SSWG or ORMG could be tasked with the preparation of the PHL. The purpose of the PHL is to
systematically identify facility hazards. The generation of a PHL early in the development of a program is
key to the success of the facility system safety effort. The Associate Administrator of the Sponsoring
Organization is responsible for generating mission requirements for JRC decision points (see Section 2.1).
The PHL should be included with this data. Participation by or delegation to the intended user of the
facility in generating the PHL increases the quality of this initial safety risk analysis.
This PHL effort serves several important functions. It provides the FAA with an early vehicle for
identifying safety, health, and environmental concerns. The results of this determination are used to size
the scope of the necessary safety effort for the specification, design and construction activities. It provides
the Associate Administrator with the data necessary to assess the cost of the safety effort and include it in
requests for funding. By requiring the PHL to accompany the funding documentation, funding for system
safety tasks becomes an integral part of the budget process.
Generation of the initial PHL includes identification of safety critical areas. Areas that need special safety
emphasis (e.g., walk-through risk analysis) are identified. The process for identifying hazards can be
accomplished through the use of checklists, lessons learned, compliance inspections/audits, accidents/near
1 System Safety Analysis Handbook, System Safety Society, July 1993.
FAA System Safety Handbook, Chapter 12: Facilities Safety
December 30, 2000
12 - 15
misses, regulatory developments, and brainstorming sessions. For existing facilities, the PHL can be
created using information contained in the Environment and Safety Information System (ESIS). All
available sources should be used for identifying, characterizing, and controlling safety risks. Examples of
　
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