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based on certain unique hazards.
The approach to facility risk categorization is summarized in Figure 12-2.
Figure 12-2 Facility Risk Categorization
For example, the following three risk categories can be used:
Low-risk facilities; i.e., housing, and administrative buildings. In these types of facilities, risks to building
occupants are low and limited normally to those associated with everyday life. Accident experience with
similar structures must be acceptable, and no additional hazards (e.g., flammable liquids, toxic materials,
etc.) are to be introduced by the building occupants. Except in special cases, no further system safety
hazard analysis is necessary for low risk facility programs.
Medium-risk facilities; i.e., maintenance facilities, heating plants, or benign facilities with safety critical
missions such as Air Traffic Control (ATC) buildings. This group of facilities often presents industrial
type safety risks to the building occupants and the loss of the facility's operation has an impact on the
safety of the NAS. Accidents are generally more frequent and potentially more severe. A preliminary
hazard analysis (PHA) is appropriate. System hazard Analysis (SHA) and Subsystem Hazard Analysis
(SSHA) may also be appropriate. The facility design or systems engineering team members are major
contributors to these analyses. User community participation is also important.
High-risk facilities; i.e., high-energy-related facilities, fuel storage, or aircraft maintenance. This category
usually contains unique hazards of which only an experienced user of similar facility will have detailed
knowledge. Because of this, it is appropriate for the user or someone with applicable user experience to
prepare the PHA in addition to the PHL. Additional hazard analyses (e.g., system, subsystem, operating
and support hazard analyses may be required).
Another example is presented in FAA Order 3900.19, FAA Occupational Safety and Health Program.
This Order requires that “increased risk workplaces be inspected twice a year and all general workplaces
once a year.” Increased risk workplaces are based on an evaluation by an Occupational Safety and Health
professional and include areas such as battery rooms and mechanical areas.
In facility system safety applications, there are many ways of classifying risk which are based o n
exposures, such as fire loading, or hazardous materials. The National Fire Protection Association provides
details on these various risk categorization schemes. (See page 12-34 NFPA Health (hazard) Identification
System).
Initial Risk
Categorization
Facility’s Mission
Energy Sources
! Type
! Magnitude
Occupancy
Lessons Learned
Low
Medium
High
Risk
FAA System Safety Handbook, Chapter 12: Facilities Safety
December 30, 2000
12 - 9
12.4 Facility System Safety Program
Preparation of a facility system safety program involves the same tasks detailed in Chapter 5. However,
there are unique applications and facility attributes which are discussed in this section.
12.4.1 General Recommendations for a Facility System Safety Program
Listed below are a number of general recommendations which are appropriate. This list is provided for
example purposes only.
·  A formal system safety program should be implemented. Significant benefits can be
realized by initiating a system safety program. This benefit is the ability to coordinate
assessments, risk resolution, and hazard tracking activities.
·  Job safety analyses (JSAs) should be used to identify task-specific hazards for the
purpose of informing and training maintenance staff and operators.
·  The JSAs can be generated using the information provided in the O&SHA.
·  Copies of the JSA should be incorporated into the procedures outlined in operating
manuals for quick reference before conducting a particular analyzed task.
·  First line supervisors should be trained in methods of conducting a JSA.
·  Analyses should be updated by verification and validation of hazards and controls
through site visits, further document review, and consultation with Subject Matter
Experts (SMEs).
·  The analysis of the available operating procedures can identify implied procedures that
are often not analyzed or documented, such as the transport of LRUs to and from the
equipment to be repaired. There may be unrecognized risks associated with these
undocumented procedures.
·  It is critical that all available documentation be reviewed and site visits be performed
to ensure the safety of operators and maintainers of the system.
　
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