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in conjunction with the US Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA). The second version of the toolbox was released in mid-
2005, with the addition of safety data analysis tools from the
US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).
At the same time, the first version of the Integrated Risk
Picture (IRP) project, which shows the relative risks in the ATM
gate to gate cycle, including what types of controller error are
dominant, has reached the validation stage. A parallel IRP for
2012 is being developed to determine where safety
investment is most needed. This will pave the way forward for
a ‘Safety Roadmap’, which will help ensure that the mid-term
ATM vision (2012-2017), and the transition towards that vision,
remain safe. It will also enable safety monitoring of the
evolution of ATM towards this vision as new ATM system
elements and changes are implemented, and ‘correction’ if it
should become required (if safety ‘tracking’ indicates a safety
‘shortfall’ during this transition period).
155
HARMONISING THE
USE OF GROUND-BASED
SAFETY NETS
David Learmount examines the need to standardise ground-based safety nets
© Flughafen München GmbH
EUROCONTROL AND ACI EUROPE EXPERTISE: CONTRIBUTION TO IMPROVING AVIATION
Perhaps it is not surprising that, at a time when most of the
air transport industry is still managing safety reactively, some
ANSPs will not see safety-net systems as a priority. Their
rationale is that safety nets are not fundamental to the
functioning of the air traffic management (ATM) task as a
whole – by definition they are there only to save the situation
when the ATM system has failed. Pilots are blessed with an ont
seems obvious that ground-based safety-net systems –
tools that alert air traffic controllers to impending
potentially hazardous situations – are essential to all
modern Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) in Europe’s
increasingly busy skies. But apparently this is not so – there is
a wide divergence of opinion among ANSPs on how important
such systems are, and what form they should take.
I
157
EUROCONTROL AND ACI EUROPE EXPERTISE: CONTRIBUTION TO IMPROVING AVIATION
EUROCONTROL’s SPIN
survey highlighted that
there are no harmonised
or uniform optimisation
procedures and
validation criteria
board safety-net system that warns them of conflicting traffic
and directs their evasive action; this is the Airborne Collision
Avoidance System (ACAS). Its ground-based counterpart for
controllers is Short Term Conflict Alert (STCA). STCA is a
system that detects and highlights potential hazardous
situations in time for controllers to intervene and prevent
them becoming collisions. It works simply by causing the onscreen
data blocks associated with the two conflicting aircraft
to flash, giving the controller some 30-90 second warning,
which is enough time for him/her to order an immediate
trajectory change for one or both aircraft.
When EUROCONTROL’s expert on the subject, Ben Bakker,
carried out a continent-wide survey of safety-net systems he
found practices differed wherever he looked. He says that, in
terms of feasibility and of priorities, at least everyone is
agreed that the first ground-based safety net that must be
universally applied is STCA, so it is this system that has been
the subject of the early studies. There were many causal
factors involved in the 2002 mid-air collision over Überlingen,
southern Germany, but two were related to the safety-net
systems: one of the pilots countermanded his ACAS advisory
and descended instead of climbing; and the controller had no
STCA because it was undergoing maintenance. The STCA
alone could have prevented the accident. Yet today there are
some European ANSPs without operational STCA.
Under Bakker’s direction, EUROCONTROL’s Survey of
Practices in Safety Nets (SPIN) “highlighted that there are no
harmonised or uniform optimisation procedures and
validation criteria. In most cases, there is no explicit, overall
policy and little or no involvement of the Regulatory
Authorities”. The split between those ANSPs with effective
STCA and those without it, Bakker discovered, seemed to be
the result of each organisation’s safety management
policymaking style: if management tended to be reactive,
the ANSP would either have no STCA or be content with a
flawed one that had probably been installed as part of a
radar replacement package rather than as a buyer-specified
　
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