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tool – with the result that there was inadequate transfer of
system knowledge from supplier to user. On the other hand,
the ANSPs that have implemented an effective STCA have
usually done so as a part of a deliberate, specified systems
upgrade or as the result of a safety management appraisal,
both of which are the hallmarks of proactive safety
management style.
Having revealed this wide divergence in equipment
standards, management style, local regulatory requirements
and attitudes to safety-net systems, Bakker determined that
he would have to establish a case for action. This, he says,
would have to quantify “all the direct, indirect and hidden
costs and benefits of safety nets”. It is imperative to persuade
all the ANSPS that safety nets are needed, he argues, because
the installation of STCA was specified in the late 1990s as a
harmonisation objective. That voluntary basis did not work, he
says, so now STCA needs to be made a compulsory standard,
like ACAS was in 2000. The problem with ACAS at Überlingen
was that, although the standards for the equipment had been
globally harmonised, the standard operating procedures for
pilot reaction to its alerts had not. Differences of
interpretation about how STCA should be operated cannot be
allowed to fall into the same trap.
Bakker refers to safety nets in the plural: programmes now
have to bear in mind not only the need for Europe-wide
implementation of effective STCA as soon as possible, but in
the slightly longer-term the introduction of Minimum Safe
Altitude Warning (MSAW). Like STCA this is a radar-display
focused warning system that alerts the controllers to the fact
that climbing or descending aircraft are below the safe
altitude for their navigational position, hence are in danger of
colliding with terrain. Although keeping the aircraft safe from
terrain is primarily the pilot’s role, an independent safety-net
system that alerts the controller in time to warn the pilot of
danger is a comforting backup, especially considering that
this kind of accident – the category known as ‘controlled
flight into terrain’ (CFIT) – kills more passengers and crew than
any other type. The onboard safety-net system – the Terrain
Awareness Warning System (TAWS) – is reckoned to be almost
completely effective, but older aircraft and smaller ones are
not fitted with it.
There are two other ground-based alert systems on the
cards: the Approach Path Monitor (APM), which is rather like a
precision MSAW for the final approach to the runway, and the
Area Proximity Warning (APW), which warns controllers that an
aircraft is about to penetrate airspace it should not enter. The
problem with all these systems, Bakker says, is that although
off-the-shelf technology with these capabilities exists today,
each installation has to be customised to its local area, and
this requires considerable expertise of a type not all ANSPs
have, and that customisation process requires a lot of time.
Among those ANSPs that have STCA but are not using it
fully because of controller objections to nuisance alerts,
Bakker believes the system might work better if the
organisation were able to provide a higher standard of
technical expertise in managing and maintaining it, and could
provide improved training for the controllers who use it. All
these results of early investigation need validation, explains
Bakker, but when the problems are fully understood, the work
to agree common definitions for safety-net usage and
operation can be finalised. Bakker says that agreement on
STCA standards should be achieved by the end of 2005, and
those agreed standards should have been validated within a
year. Implementation should then be achieved by 2008, he
estimates. He adds the proviso that, even then, some ANSPs
may need additional time and assistance to reach the
standards required.
It is imperative to
persuade all the
ANSPs that safety
nets are needed
EUROCONTROL AND ACI EUROPE EXPERTISE: CONTRIBUTION TO IMPROVING AVIATION
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EUROCONTROL AND ACI EUROPE EXPERTISE: CONTRIBUTION TO IMPROVING AVIATION
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SAFETY CRITICAL
HUMAN FACTORS
Safety is at the heart of a functional aviation system, and human beings remain essential to
ensuring that safety is not only maintained, but improved. Julian Moxon reports
hile there are an increasing number of
technology-based solutions available to
help air traffic controllers, managers and
other critical stakeholders to do their job, human failures
continue to occur.
　
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