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8.4.12 Even if automatic waypoint position reporting via data link (e.g. ADS, CPDLC or FMC WPR) is being used to provide position reports to ATC the above checks should still be performed.
8.4.13 The crew should be prepared for possible ATC follow-up to the position report.
8.4.14 Crews should also be aware that trials are underway in the NAT Region of ADS-C conformance monitoring. ATC may establish event contracts that will result in automatic alerts whenever the aircraft diverges from its cleared profile. Unless previously advised by the pilot of the need for such a divergence, crews should expect ATC to query the situation. Standardised CPDLC alert messages have been developed for use here.
Routine Monitoring
8.4.15 It is important to remember that there are a number of ways in which the autopilot may unobtrusively become disconnected from the steering mode. Therefore, regular checks of correct engagement with the navigation system should be made.
8.4.16 It is recommended that where possible the navigation system coupled to the autopilot should display the present position co-ordinates throughout the flight. If these are then plotted as suggested above, they will provide confirmation that the aircraft is tracking in accordance with its ATC clearance. Distance to go information should be available on the instrument panel, whilst a waypoint alert light, where fitted, provides a reminder of the aircraft‟s imminent arrival over the next waypoint.
8.4.17 A position check should be made at each waypoint and the present position plotted 10 minutes after passing each waypoint. For a generally east-west flight, this 10 minute point will be approximately 2 degrees of longitude beyond the oceanic waypoint. It may therefore in fact be simpler to plot a present position 2 degrees of longitude after each 10 degree waypoint. There may be circumstances, (e.g. when, due to equipment failure, only one LRNS remains serviceable) in which additional plots midway between each waypoint may be justified.
8.4.18 It is good practice to cross checks winds midway between oceanic waypoints by comparing the flight plan, LRNS and upper millibar wind charts data. The LRNS information will need to be included in a position report if the flight has either be designated as an OTS MET reporting flight or is a flight on a random route. Such a cross check will also aid crews in case there is a subsequent need for a contingency requiring the use of Dead Reckoning.
8.4.19 The navigation system not being used to steer the aircraft should display cross-track distance and track angle error. Both of these should be monitored, with cross-track distance being displayed on the HSI where feasible.
Approaching Landfall
8.4.20 When the aircraft is within range of land based navaids, and the crew is confident that these navaids are providing reliable navigation information, consideration should be given to updating the LRNSs. Automatic updating of the LRNSs from other navaids should be closely monitored, and before entry into airspace where different navigation requirements have been specified (e.g. RNP5 in European BRNAV airspace), crews should use all aids (including VORs and DMEs) to confirm that the in-use navigation
NORTH ATLANTIC MNPSA OPERATIONS MANUAL CHAPTER 8
NAT MNPS 51 Edition 2009
system is operating to the required accuracy. If there is any doubt regarding system accuracy, the appropriate ATC unit should be informed.
8.5 SPECIAL IN-FLIGHT PROCEDURES
Strategic Lateral Offset Procedures (SLOP)
8.5.1 ATC clearances are designed to ensure that separation standards are continually maintained for all traffic. However, the chain of clearance definition, delivery and execution involves a series of technical system processes and human actions. Errors are very rare but they do occur. Neither pilots nor controllers are infallible. Gross Navigation Errors (usually involving whole latitude degree mistakes in route waypoints) are made, and aircraft are sometimes flown at flight levels other than those expected by the controller. When such errors are made, ironically, the extreme accuracies of modern navigation and height keeping systems themselves increase the risk of an actual collision. Within an SSR environment the controller is alerted to such errors and can, using VHF voice communications, intervene in a timely fashion. This is not the case in Oceanic airspace, such as the North Atlantic, where the controller‟s awareness of traffic disposition is reliant largely upon pilot voice position reports and communications utilise HF or SATCOM Voice through a third party radio operator. Consequently, it has been determined that allowing aircraft conducting oceanic flight to fly self-selected lateral offsets will provide an additional safety margin and mitigate the risk of traffic conflict when non-normal events such as aircraft navigation errors, height deviation errors and turbulence induced altitude-keeping errors do occur. Collision risk is significantly reduced by application of these offsets. These procedures are known as “Strategic Lateral Offset Procedures (SLOP)”.
　
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