曝光臺 注意防騙 網曝天貓店富美金盛家居專營店坑蒙拐騙欺詐消費者

Nagoya Airport. The contents of the briefing relating to the weather at Hakodate Airport
and its vicinity were as follows: Approach Procedure: ILS RWY 12, Ground Visibility: 5–
10km, Winds: strong, but no hindrance to landing.
The aircraft took off from Nagoya Airport at 11:53, and then, the aircraft thence
proceeded to Hakodate Airport via Akita VOR/DME and Aomori VOR/DME. After beginning
descent from cruise altitude, the aircraft was radar vectored onto the final approach course
by the Hakodate Approach Control, and commenced an ILS Runway 12 approach at
Hakodate Airport.
During the approach, the Captain assumed the duties of Pilot Not Flying (PNF) from
the left cockpit seat, while the right-seated First Officer assumed Pilot Flying (PF) duties.
The aircraft encountered light turbulence during the approach. Hakodate Airport Tower
reported the wind for runway 12 as 130°/28kt, a strong and slightly right crosswind.
Although the approach course and flight path angle of aircraft were both normal during
the approach, the aircraft’s wind shear warning system issued an aural wind shear warning
at around 140 m from the runway threshold, at an altitude of 53 ft above ground level (AGL)
while the aircraft was flying over the approach lights for runway 12.
Although the crew initiated a go-around to recover from the wind shear, the aircraft’s
aft fuselage contacted the runway at around 13:03, and as a result substantial damage was
sustained. The aircraft continued to go around for recovery from the wind shear after
contacted aft fuselage with the runway. The crew made another ILS approach to runway 12,
and landed at Hakodate Airport at around 13:21 uneventfully.
An external check after arrival found that damage had been sustained to the lower
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surface of the aft fuselage.
Of the 93 persons aboard flight 391 - 87 passengers and six crewmembers - three of the
four cabin attendants sustained minor injuries such as bruising of the lower back etc.
2.1.2 Statements of Persons Concerned regarding the History of Flight
2.1.2.1 Statements of the Flight Crew
(1) Statements of The Captain
“Although I knew there were rain and strong winds at our destination of Hakodate, the
winds were almost headwinds and I did not consider wind shear, cross wind limits nor
the like.
“We flied in cloud during the descent towards Hakodate airport. There were no big
changes in the upper and lower winds or wind direction during the time we were radar
vectored onto the final approach course of ILS runway 12 approach by the approach
control, no different to the information received from the Tower. The airborne weather
radar only indicated areas of rain, no red areas that should be avoided.
“During the approach, as it was rain, I sighted the runway as we were descending
through around 2,000 ft (MSL). I recognized that the wind was from 140° at strength of
30 – 40 kt, and that there were wind variances but that the average was 25 – 30 kt with
occasional gusts exceeding 40 kt. Because we were flying in cloud, the engine and wing
anti-ice were switched 'ON’. There were no “virga”, and there were no particularly
unusual changes in the cloud conditions.
“I was acting as a PNF from the left seat. The First Officer, acting as a PF,
disconnected auto-thrust at 1,000 ft MSL and disengaged the autopilot at around 500 ft
MSL. The wind speed was fluctuating, and I called-out ‘Airspeed’ as our speed dropped 5
kt below the target value. Since he was making appropriate corrections and we were not
deviating from the localizer or glide path, I allowed the First Officer to continue the PF
duty. At around 100 ft AGL, I called-out ‘Airspeed, airspeed’ as our speed abruptly
dropped more than 10 kt below the target value, and the First Officer increased power.
“After that, just as the power had started to be reduced, the aural wind shear warning
issued. Although we began wind shear recovery, increased power to maximum thrust, we
contacted the ground during the recovery. When we contacted the ground, I thought we
had made a landing hardly, but I did not realize we had scraped the tail. The target
approach airspeed was 143 kt, 11–12 kt greater than the VLS. Since the wind-shear
warning is inhibited below 50 ft AGL, I think perhaps it sounded at a higher altitude of
between 100–50 ft AGL. There was a large sink at around 100 ft AGL, but no rolling left
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or right. The wind information from the Tower was 130° at twenty-something knots.
“Although this type of aircraft has a tendency to land with nose down pitch attitude if
the approach speed is too high, we selected +11kt against the on-board computer
　
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