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was compressed by the touch down.
From that time till around 13:03:02, the pitch input signal from the Captain’s side stick
moved from backward to the neutral value. It is thought that the Captain either released
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his side stick thinking that as the result of the high pitch due to recovery control actions,
the aircraft’s flight path was able to reach the runway, or he released the side stick after
actions to lower the nose thinking that there was the possibility that the aft fuselage
might strike the ground if the pitch attitude at touch down were excessive.
At around 13:03:02, recordings from the ground contact sensors installed in each of the
aircraft’s main landing gears indicate both main gears were on the ground. Further, the
aircraft’s pitch angle reduced slightly from 11.2 degrees to 10.5 degrees after touch down.
This is thought to be the result of either the lower surface of the aft fuselage striking the
ground, or due to actions immediately beforehand by the flight crew to prevent the nose
rising further that caused pitch angle to decrease slightly. It is estimated that from
around this time, engine fuel flow was gradually increasing towards its maximum value,
and the aircraft was transiting to a climb.
However, over the two second period from this time till around 13:03:04, the first
officer’s side stick was almost full forwarded. While it is considered possible that the
action to pitch down was to avoid striking the runway due to an excessive pitch up
attitude. On the other hand, at the same time as this action by the PF, the input signals
from the Captain’s side stick indicate pulling the stick backward from the neutral
position to pitch up, in the opposite direction to the first officer’s control input. Because
the magnitude of the first officer’s side stick control input was greater than that of the
Captain, the aircraft’s pitch attitude, which had exceeded 15 degrees pitch up, reduced to
approximately 5 degrees by around 13:03:09.
At around 13:03:03, while the aircraft was climbing through around 14ft AGL, CAS
increased to 141kt, and the PF commanded the flaps to be raised.
At around 13:03:04, as described in the section 2.12.3, engine fuel flow reached its
maximum value. It is estimated that because the first officer’s side stick was pulled back
from this time, the aircraft had resumed a normal climb attitude and continued to climb
from around 13:03:10.
At around 13:03:20, after the aircraft had been configured for climb, the crew reported
to Hakodate Tower that a go-around was being executed due to wind shear.
It is estimated that the Captain took over control of the aircraft thereafter.
(Refer to Figs. 2, 8-1 and 8-2)
3.1.5 Forecast Wind Variations
(1) The Weather Conditions on the Day of the Accident
Concerning the weather conditions on the day of the accident, as described in the
section 2.7.1, is considered that due to the relationship between a low pressure system
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developing over the Japan Sea and a high pressure system developing over the east of
Hokkaido, the isobar spacing between Hokkaido and the Tohoku Region narrowed and a
very high atmospheric pressure gradient was gradually developing. Furthermore, as
described in the section 2.7.3 (1), the airport forecast for Hakodate Airport from 12:00 to
18:00, issued at 09:00 by the Hakodate Airport Office of the Hakodate Marine
Meteorological Observatory, forecasted a wind direction of 110° and a wind speed of 30kt
with gusts of up to 50kt. It is therefore considered that strong wind conditions
accompanied gust was expected at Hakodate Airport, and that there was sufficient
information that the flight crew should have expected gusts. Further, according to the
forecast chart for bad weather shown in Figure 5, it is considered that the forecast
weather conditions indicated that as the result of movement of the low-pressure system,
Hakodate was expected to fall into the region of bad weather, with moderate turbulence.
At the time just before the accident occurred, although there was not much variation of
surface wind direction, the average wind speed was approximately 28kt, with a
maximum speed of around 40kt and a minimum speed of around 20kt.
According to the wind condition chart shown in Figure 7, it is considered that this
gusty strong wind condition was continued until evening of the day of the accident
occurred.
(2) Provision of Weather Information to the Flight Crew
The weather information regarding wind conditions at Hakodate Airport that the flight
crew was provided with during the flight is as follows.
According to the ATIS issued at 12:00, the average wind speed was 28kt with no gust
　
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