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now that we have upon landing at Helsinki less than our minimum fuel, so formally
we are getting into an emergency situation due to the fuel.” From the ATC point of
view a clear fuel emergency report should have been made because the pilots knew that
they would have less fuel than the final reserve fuel at landing. The controller must decide
what kind of alarm he/she will give and the rescue services need some more preparing
time in case of a heavy aircraft than a small aircraft incident. The weather at Helsinki-
Vantaa was good, sky almost clear and winds were light. The ACC gave an arrival
clearance to runway 15 at 05.42.00 and a descend clearance at 05.42.40. SK946 was
allowed to fly inbound Helsinki-Vantaa without restriction and the pilots could plan their
flight profile freely.
TAMPERE ACC transferred SK946 to HELSINKI APPROACH at 05.45.30. The APP
offered after radar identification a short approach, but the pilots requested a normal approach.
SK946 reported at 05.50.00: “Approach, Scandinavian 946, if for any unforeseen
reason we have to make a missed approach, we will make a circuit for the new
attempt.” APP replied: “Scandinavian 946, roger, in case of missed approach, you will
make a visual approach runway 15.” APP added a few seconds later: “If necessary for
shorter track miles, the runway 22 left is available in case of missed approach.” SK946
got from ATC as good service as possible and the pilots were allowed to make as economical
and safe flight profile as they could.
The rescue service was alarmed for the SK946 landing. Flight landed uneventfully at
05.56. The remaining fuel was 1800 kg. According to the A330 FCOM of the airline the
fuel quantity corresponding to 30 minutes holding is 2300 kg at 1500 feet above the alternate
airport elevation at green dot speed in the clean configuration and the calculations
are based on the actual landing weight of the aircraft. Calculating according to this
C 9/2003 L
Airliner landing with low fuel at Helsinki-Vantaa airport on 3.10.2003
28
FCOM rule the remaining 1800 kg corresponds to about 23 minutes of flight time, but a
possible missed approach requires fuel about 500 kg which reduces the usable flight
time considerably.
According to the RODOS calculation of the airline FOM the diversion fuel is calculated
according to the SID giving the longest missed approach distance and to the least favourable
landing runway. In Arlanda the runway 26 would have given the longest distance
but SK946 followed the SID from runway 01L and in Helsinki-Vantaa it landed to
the most favourable runway 15. The cruising level used was 270 instead of 290, but the
difference is marginal when flying long range cruise. SK946 had reached flight level 270
when it contacted TAMPERE ACC 11 minutes 50 seconds after the missed approach.
SK946 used however fuel from the missed approach in Arlanda to landing in Helsinki-
Vantaa 4300 kg. The consumption in the OFP was calculated to be 3700 kg. Scandinavian
Airlines should check the basis of the alternate fuel calculations of RODOS Planning
system.
2.5 Procedures of the airline
The investigators had available the copies of used master operational flight plans from
34 flights using the designator SK946 from Chicago to Arlanda between dates 8.9.2003
and 15.10.2003 operated with A330. The total fuel consumption or the remaining block
fuel was not marked in any of these master OPFs. The last fuel check was marked 45
minutes to 2 h 32 min before landing. To make it possible to verify afterwards the fuel
consumption, the checks should be marked until the top of descend. The total fuel consumption
should be marked as well. Scandinavian Airlines should order the pilots to
enter the markings accordingly.
According to the researched OFPs a third part of the flights had consumed fuel according
to the calculations or less and two thirds had consumed fuel more than calculated. In
three cases the fuel difference was more than the calculated contingency fuel and the
maximum difference to the OFP calculation was -2.2 t. The basis of the cruise fuel consumption
calculations seems to be realistic and it is possible to operate within the contingency
fuel by optimising the fuel economy during flight. Supposing that the rest of
flight from 10 W went according to the RODOS calculations, in three these flights, if diversion
to alternate had been needed, the fuel remaining in the alternate airport had
probably been less than the calculated final reserve fuel of 2.3 t.
The manner to change the approach sequence between the approaching aircraft in TMA
without clearing any emergency is not according to the ICAO ATC regulations or recommendations.
　
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