曝光臺 注意防騙 網(wǎng)曝天貓店富美金盛家居專營店坑蒙拐騙欺詐消費(fèi)者

c) to bring to senior management’s attention any identified changes needed to maintain or improve
safety;
d) to act as the focal point for dealings with the safety regulatory authority;
e) to provide specialist advice and assistance regarding safety issues;
f) to develop a safety management awareness and understanding throughout the entire organization;
and
g) to act as a proactive focal point for safety issues.
17.2 ATS SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
17.2.1 Chapter 12 provides ten steps for “getting started” in setting up an SMS. The ten steps have
equal application to safety management in ATS, and that chapter should be read in conjunction with this
section. In addition, the considerations discussed below apply to managing safety in ATS.
Safety performance indicators and safety targets
17.2.2 The notion of safety performance indicators and safety targets is introduced in Chapters 1
and 5. Before attempting to determine whether the safety performance of a system, or the safety impact of
planned changes to it, is acceptable, a decision must be made concerning what criteria will be used to judge
acceptability. ICAO provisions relating to safety management for aircraft operators, aerodrome operators
and ATS providers incorporate requirements pertaining to achieving an acceptable level of safety. The
acceptable level of safety shall be determined by the State(s) concerned.
17.2.3 Annex 11 requires States to establish an acceptable level of safety applicable to the provision
of ATS within their airspace and at their aerodromes.
17.2.4 In order to determine what is an acceptable level of safety, it is first necessary to decide on
appropriate safety performance indicators and then on what represents an acceptable outcome. The safety
performance indicators chosen need to be appropriate for the application. Typical measures which could be
used in safety management in ATS include:
a) maximum probability of an undesirable event, such as a collision, loss of separation or runway
incursion;
b) maximum number of incidents per 10 000 aircraft movements;
17-4 Safety Management Manual (SMM)
c) maximum acceptable number of separation losses per 10 000 trans-Atlantic crossings; and
d) maximum number of short-term conflict alerts (STCAs) per 10 000 aircraft movements.
17.2.5 Since aviation accidents are rare events, accident rates are not good indicators of safety
performance. They may be of limited value at the global, regional or national level. However, the absence of
accidents may belie many unsafe conditions in the system, creating situations “ripe for an accident”.
Accident rates are even less useful as an indicator of safety when applied to individual aerodromes or flight
information regions (FIRs). For any given FIR, for example, the expected time between en-route accidents
could be in excess of 100 years.
17.2.6 Incident rates may be more useful indicators of ATS safety performance, for example, reported
air proximities, technical losses of separation, TCAS warning and alert messages, losses of radar coverage
and power outages.
17.2.7 Indicators based on safety occurrences are only as good as the reporting or monitoring
systems through which such occurrences are recorded and tracked. For this to be effective, the culture of
the organization must encourage the filing and recording of the required reports. The importance of an
organization’s safety culture is discussed in Chapter 4, and potential limitations on the use of information
from voluntary incident reporting systems are addressed in Chapter 7.
17.2.8 Whenever quantitative safety performance targets are set, it must be possible to measure, or
estimate, the achieved level of safety in quantitative terms. If a target of this type is to be applied to en-route
operations within a single FIR, or instrument approaches at a single aerodrome, then the expected
frequency of accidents is so low that data on actual accidents will not give a valid indication of whether the
target is being met.
17.2.9 Quantitative targets are used, for example, in assessing the safety of operations in reduced
vertical separation minimum (RVSM) airspace. However, in this case, the assessment of the achieved level
of safety is done using mathematical collision risk models which can estimate the expected rate of accidents
from data on aircraft height deviations that did not result in an accident. Similar models are used in the
estimation of collision risk as the result of lateral deviations from track in the North Atlantic minimum
navigation performance specifications (MNPS) airspace, and oceanic airspace where required navigation
performance (RNP) based separation minima are used.
17.2.10 The techniques used in this form of safety assessment are beyond the scope of this manual.
　
中國航空網(wǎng) www.k6050.com
航空翻譯 www.aviation.cn
本文鏈接地址：Safety Management Manual (SMM) 安全管理手冊(129)