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Competency requirements and, where appropriate, licensing requirements should be documented in the job
description for each safety-related position. These requirements should then be reflected in the recruitment
requirements and internal training for these positions.
12-8 Safety Management Manual (SMM)
All line managers should be accountable for ensuring the continuing competence of the personnel in safetyrelated
positions within their areas of responsibility. This includes ensuring that any recurrent training
requirements are met.
All training programmes should include training in those aspects of the SMS and associated procedures that
are relevant to the position in question.
Guidance on safety management training is included in Chapter 15.
Confirmation Checklist #3
ORGANIZATION
􀂾 The organizational structure facilitates:
— lines of communication between the SM and the CEO and with the line managers;
— a clear definition of authorities, accountabilities and responsibilities, thereby avoiding
misunderstanding, overlap and conflict (e.g. between the SM and line management); and
— hazard identification and safety oversight.
􀂾 An SM (with appropriate competencies and capacity) has been appointed.
􀂾 The roles and responsibilities of the SM (and any staff) are clearly defined and documented.
􀂾 A safety committee meets regularly to review safety results and make recommendations to
senior management.
􀂾 The SM (and any staff) has (have) received appropriate safety training.
􀂾 Staff and management understand and support the roles of the SM, and the SM receives the
CEO’s support.
STEP 4: HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
The risks and costs inherent in commercial aviation necessitate a rational process for decision-making.
Implementation of risk management processes is critical to an effective safety management programme.
Risks cannot always be eliminated, nor are all conceivable safety management measures economically
feasible. Risk management facilitates this balancing act, beginning with hazard identification.
As outlined in Chapter 5, the creation and operation of effective hazard identification programmes are
fundamental to effective safety management. An organization may draw from a broad choice of safety activities
to identify hazards or safety issues warranting further action. Some of these issues may derive from specific
safety hazards that place a part of the operation in jeopardy. Other issues warranting attention may derive from
organizational shortcomings, whereby systemic safety defences that should be working are not.
Hazard identification may be reactive or proactive in nature. Trend monitoring, occurrence reporting and
investigations are essentially reactive. Other hazard identification processes actively seek feedback by
Chapter 12. Establishing a Safety Management System 12-9
Figure 12-1. An operator’s organization for safety management: Sample A
Figure 12-2. An operator’s organization for safety management: Sample B
Certificate Holder
(Accountable Executive)
Director of Flight Operations
Flight Safety Officer
Director of Maintenance
Maintenance Safety Officer
Safety Manager
Formal reporting
Informal administrative communications
Formal reporting
Informal reporting
Chief Executive Officer
Safety Manager Quality Manager
Operations Maintenance Other
12-10 Safety Management Manual (SMM)
observing and analysing routine day-to-day operations. Some of the more common safety activities that
might be subject to formal processes within the organization are listed below:
— safety assessments;
— trend monitoring;
— incident reporting;
— safety surveys and audits; and
— proactive hazard identification processes (such as FDA, LOSA and NOSS).
Chapters 16 and 17 outline several safety processes known to be effective in hazard identification. An
organization’s willingness to utilize several different hazard identification processes is an example of its
commitment to safety.
To be successful, the hazard identification process must take place within a non-punitive (or just) safety
culture. Management’s interest is in learning of potential weaknesses in the system’s safety net that could
lead to an accident or otherwise compromise the efficiency of the operation. Blame is only an issue when
individuals are culpable of reckless or negligent behaviour. If workers operate in a climate of fear of
punishment for normal slips, lapses and mistakes in their daily duties, errors and unsafe conditions are likely
to remain hidden.
Confirmation Checklist #4
　
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