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(...) automation is justified if further improvement in efficiency is required (...)
(...) Consideration must be given to the costs associated with :
(...)
c)-computers, displays, sensor interfaces, associated peripherals, spare parts and other equipment;
(...)
h)-training of ATC personnel;
i)-equipment and software maintenance and modifications;
j)-inter-unit communications requirements;
(...) Such automation would not change the role of the controller, although it may give him additional tasks in providing information to the computer. A further stage in automation comprises facilities to take over, or assist in, some of the controller’s less complex decision making tasks, without significantly changing the ATC system or the responsibilities of the controller.
Extension of the application of automation beyond this stage will undoubtedly necessitate some fundamental changes to ATC procedures and the role of the controller. (...)
(...) The application of automation will eventually require new and different tasks to be introduced for controllers. Controller training to accommodate these changes is most important, since controllers rely greatly on experience gained with the system through constant exposure to live traffic. If the system, including equipment, changes significantly, a period of retraining is necessary to re-establish confidence and develop experience with the new equipment and procedures.
(...) The importance for ATS of a reliable and efficient message switching system cannot be overemphasised.(...)
(...) Voice communications are essential in air traffic control. (...)
(...) the communications facilities available to controllers should reflect the flexibility and re-configuration capability conferred by ATS data processing systems. (..)
(...) Display of the present traffic situation and of aircraft intentions is required to enable controllers to make effective decisions. (...)
ANNEX 2 Attachment A
EXAMPLE METHODOLOGY FOR MONO-RADAR SYSTEMS
CRITERIA FOR ACCURACY OF A RADAR SYSTEM
TO SUPPORT 5/10 NM SEPARATION MINIMA
( UNITED KINGDOM )

1.  INTRODUCTION
1.1  
The Research and Development (formerly Chief Scientist) Directorate of the United Kingdom National Air Traffic Services (NATS) made available a study done in July 1994, CS Report 9449, ‘Criteria for the Accuracy of a Radar Required to Support a Given Separation Minimum’. This paper summarises the report, and presents the Conclusions and Recommendations of the Report. It does not present the full report.

2.  
PRESENTATION

2.1  The NATS Study was aimed at devising criteria which could be applied to a routinely measured distribution of radar errors, to determine whether the radar is sufficiently accurate to support a given separation minimum. The parameters used were the required separation minimum and the critical value for the Horizontal Overlap Probability (HOP). The HOP is the probability that two aircraft are displayed to a controller as being correctly separated when they are in fact overlapping. For purposes of this study each aircraft was modelled in plan view as a disk of diameter 61.1 meters. This is a conservative estimate of the average length of an aircraft - it is larger than the average wingspan. Two aircraft are in overlap when their centres are horizontally separated by less than 61.1 meters.
2.2  The separation minimum is considered acceptable when the HOP is less than a critical value which is derived by multiplying the Target Level of Safety (TLS) and the passing frequency in a given airspace, i.e. the number of times two aircraft pass with minimum horizontal and no vertical separation. This allows the HOP to be computed in terms of overlaps per flight hour.
2.3  Based on global standards set by ICAOs Review of the General Concept of Separation Panel (RGCSP), the TLS to be used is 2X10-8 fatal accidents per flight hour until the year 2000, and 5X10-9 for an application put in place after 2000. NATS currently allocates 10% of this target of 5X10-9 fatal accidents per flight hour to the risk of collision due to inaccurate radar. As a result, the TLS currently allocated to accidents caused by inaccurate radar is 5X10-10 fatal accidents per flight hour. It should be noted that one collision is considered to be two fatal accidents. This TLS considers only the risk of collisions resulting from inaccuracies in radar data. It does not take into account other causes of risk, such as the accuracy and timeliness of the display of radar data, human error, or communications errors.
　
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