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Other examinations of the potential threat to nuclear facilities from aircraft have focused on perceived vulnerabilities of spent-fuel pools used to cool expended nuclear fuel. However, power companies maintain that a study modeling the impact
43 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.  Terrorist CBRN.
44 Staff Summary of Responses by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Correspondence from Rep. Edward J. Markey (D-MA), Member, Energy and Commerce Committee, U.S. House of Representatives.  Security Gap: A Hard Look At the Soft Spots in Our Civilian Nuclear Reactor Security. March 25, 2002.
of an aircraft crash into a spent-fuel pool wall concluded that while such a scenario could crush or crack the wall, it would not likely cause a release of radiation45.
A report prepared for the AOPA by Robert Jefferson, a nuclear reactor safety consultant, concluded that the threat to nuclear reactors from small general aviation aircraft is “practically non-existent” and “...it is unlikely that a terrorist would choose a light general aviation vehicle to threaten a nuclear power plant.”46  Jefferson’s analysis concluded that even the impact of an airliner like those used in the 9/11 attacks would, in all likelihood, be unable to penetrate the outer containment vessel and argued that the analysis referenced by Representative Markey significantly overstates the risk potential and “...overlooks the fact that by their very design, nuclear power plants are inherently resistant to [airborne attacks].”47  The report also concluded that the proximity of nuclear reactors to GA airports does not increase the exposure of these facilities to terrorist threats.
Although the specific threat posed to nuclear facilities by GA aircraft remains a contentious issue, the FAA has kept in force restrictions on circling, loitering, or otherwise flying in a suspicious manner around nuclear facilities.  Arguably, these measures would provide little deterrent against a well-planned terrorist attack. However, they highlight the continued concern over possible airborne threats to nuclear facilities, whatever the true risk may be.  More elaborate measures to protect nuclear facilities, such as implementing anti-aircraft defense capabilities around nuclear facilities, are wrought with operational and policy complexities including high costs, questionable effectiveness, and a potentially high risk of shooting down an errant GA pilot who meant no harm.
While light GA aircraft appear to pose a relatively limited threat by themselves in terms of physically damaging critical infrastructure, larger GA aircraft pose a potentially more formidable threat.  Due to the size and speed of some of these aircraft, particularly mid-sized and large business jets, they could inflict significant damage on buildings and critical infrastructure if used in a suicide attack. These aircraft have significantly larger payload and fuel capacities which would have a direct bearing on the degree of physical damage they could cause to buildings and infrastructure. Thus, in terms of both assessing risk and identifying options for mitigating the security risk posed by GA, the distinction between small GA aircraft that make up the large majority of the fleet and larger business jets has important implications.  While small aircraft appear to pose a greater threat as possible platforms for chemical or biological attacks, large business jets appear to pose more of a threat from being exploited in a suicide attack scenario similar to the September 11, 2001, attacks using commercial airliners.  Because the various sectors of GA appear to pose distinct threats, risk mitigation strategies arguably should be tailored to some degree to address the specific security threats posed by different sectors of
　
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