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Coordinated threat response was observed in the May 11, 2005 event where an errant small private airplane penetrated deep into the FRZ around Washington, DC. The coordinated response to this threat included deployment of fighter jets, helicopters from CBP, and federal and state law enforcement assets to interdict and intercept the aircraft. While the response to this perceived threat was by most accounts well coordinated, concerns have been raised that response to a more formidable threat, such as a faster moving aircraft attempting to evade airspace protections and defenses may be much more difficult to interdict and may require a carefully orchestrated response involving close coordination between responsible agencies.  While these agencies continue to assess and refine their monitoring and
95 Associated Press.  “Intercept Tests Show U.S. Air Vulnerability.”  January 15, 2004.
96 Statement by Honorable Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense before the Committee on Government Reform, United States House of Representatives, July 21, 2005.
97 Ibid.
response capabilities, Congress may continue to conduct oversight of  interagency coordination to ascertain whether there is an adequate level of preparedness to deal with airborne threats, including threats posed by GA aircraft, and assess whether steps taken to protect critical assets from aerial attacks do not unduly burden GA operators or compromise flight safety.  While the focus to date has been airspace protection in and around Washington, DC, Congress may also examine whether the capability and coordination between federal, state, and local agencies to monitor and protect airspace in other areas of the country is adequate and appropriately balances homeland security needs with air commerce and aviation safety concerns.

Related Legislative Actions in the 109th Congress
GA security has been a topic of continued legislative interest in the 109th Congress.  Based on a Senate-passed amendment introduced by Senator Clinton (S.Amdt. 1106 to H.R. 2360), conference report language in the FY2006 DHS Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-90) requires the DHS, in coordination with the Department of Transportation, to “...study the vulnerability posed to high-risk areas and facilities from general aviation aircraft that could be stolen or used as a weapon against those areas.”  Areas to be considered in the assessment include critical transportation infrastructure, nuclear facilities, military bases, and highly populated areas with similarly situated critical infrastructure.  The analysis is to identify vulnerabilities at GA airports, the sufficiency of existing security measures, and any additional security measures that could be implemented.  
Additional legislation introduced in the House would focus on site-specific measures to improve security at GA airports.  The Strengthen Aviation Security Act
(H.R. 2649), introduced by Representative Markey on May 26, 2005, would require airport operators to develop site-specific vulnerability assessments for each GA airport and develop a plan for addressing vulnerabilities identified within one year of enactment.  H.R. 2649 would also require background checks and terrorist database screening for any individuals with access to general aviation aircraft.  While the bill language, in its broadest interpretation, could apply to just about anyone who would have occasion to visit or transit through a general aviation airport, the intent appears to be focused on airport workers and pilots to parallel requirements for unescorted access to secured areas of commercial airports.  The bill would also require all GA aircraft to be secured by visible immobilizing devices such as prop locks while parked at GA airports.
　
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