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56 Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association. Proof AOPA Airport Watch Concept Works. August 12, 2004.  Frederick, MD: AOPA.
57 See Testimony of Mr. Andrew Cebula.
nor Mossaoui attracted similar attention during their initial training in small GA aircraft. Qualified pilots seeking to rent light aircraft also may attract little attention and a pilot loading a small single-engine airplane with dangerous chemicals or biological agents may look no different than a pilot loading his personal effects on board for a weekend getaway.  While single incidents like this typically arouse little suspicion, aggregate behavior that might appear somewhat odd or suspicious could collectively signal possible terrorist or criminal activity. 
An additional downside of programs like the Airport Watch Program is that they could result in unintended racial or ethnic profiling by well intentioned observers. For example, would the individuals in the St. Louis incident cited by AOPA have raised similar suspicions if they were not of “Middle Eastern appearance”? Besides the potential for falsely targeting individuals in certain racial and ethnic groups, there is also the danger that, conversely, untrained observers may not notice suspicious behavior patterns exhibited by other individuals.  Intelligence sources suspect that al Qaeda is seeking to recruit non-Middle Eastern individuals for the very reason that they may be less likely to raise suspicions.  More specific guidance and training to airport workers, tenants, and pilots could improve the effectiveness of the Airport Watch Program and other surveillance operations. 
A possible solution to overcome some of these limitations involves the implementation of behavioral pattern recognition techniques.  As described in a recent commentary on GA security, behavioral pattern recognition was highlighted as being “...designed to maximize detection while minimizing, if not eliminating, issues of civil liberties.”58  Behavioral pattern recognition – which is in use at airports worldwide and has been highlighted in numerous profiles of Israel’s El Al airlines’ pre-boarding security screening – examines deviations from normative behavioral patterns. It has been suggested that behavioral pattern recognition could be applied in the GA environment by providing specific training to maintenance and line workers, for example, making them an integral part of an airport’s security network rather than having a small number of employees responsible for security.59
One challenge in behavioral pattern recognition is that single events may not stand out, but aggregate samples of slightly unusual activity may provide tell-tale signs of preparations for launching a terrorist attack.  However, assimilating and correctly interpreting this data remains a significant challenge.  For this reason, a “reporting tree”60 is recommended for guiding decisions about responding to suspicious behavioral patterns.  The “reporting tree” concept is integrated into the TSA’s security training for flight schools, which is a required security training element for flight school employees under Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, §1552.21 et seq., but has not yet been expanded to other aspects of GA security. A reporting tree might include notifying a supervisor, such as a chief flight instructor or flight school manager, about strange inquires or behaviors by a student pilot, and escalating this information up the reporting tree to law enforcement or federal
　
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