曝光臺 注意防騙 網(wǎng)曝天貓店富美金盛家居專營店坑蒙拐騙欺詐消費者

n Conditions were VMC and Runway XX was in use
with ATIS reporting winds calm. Successfully executed
simulated short field takeoff with 50-foot obstacle…and
simulated short field landing with 50-foot obstacle…Next
activity after full-stop and taxi back…was simulated short
field takeoff with 50-foot obstacle. Put in approach flaps
and confirmed rotation and climb speeds prior to entering
runway. Positioned and held per Tower instruction.
Once cleared for takeoff, increased throttle to full while
holding yoke back fully and adding right rudder. Aircraft
yawed left when nosewheel lifted so input additional right
rudder. Aircraft continued to turn left requiring increasing
amounts of right rudder to stay on runway and turn aircraft
back toward centerline. Mains lifted off runway surface so [I]
reduced back pressure on yoke. Observed right wing dropping
and attempted to correct through yoke and rudder inputs.
After continued unsuccessful attempts to stabilize, instructor
called ‘my plane’ and took controls. Confirmed ‘your plane’
and released controls. In the process of recovery, landing, and
rollout, the aircraft departed the runway surface for the grass
area to the left of the runway and impacted a taxiway sign.
Stopped aircraft on taxiway, observed damage to left flap and
decided not to retract the flaps. Radioed Tower confirming
that we did not require assistance and intention to return to
hangar…Returned to hangar and observed damage to left
wingtip, left flap and wing surface at flap attach point, and
left horizontal stabilizer….
Here are my initial thoughts as to cause: I believe
misunderstanding of instructions being provided and
corresponding control inputs, compounded by a mistaken
assumption that if the instructor was not intervening,
things were OK, were the primary factors in the
destabilization of the aircraft and subsequent runway
excursion… Don’t become complacent because you are
with an instructor and fly/make decisions as you would
normally (i.e., as solo pilots)….
357
I fully understand that while working as an Inspector, I
work under the umbrella of Quality Control and not as a
Mechanic. The Upgrade Inspectors are expected to help out
with the normal RON workload and act as mechanics when
they can. Management never forces this, but they routinely
request it and we routinely help when we can.
The contributing [factor]: Working outside the Inspection
work area and losing focus on the task at hand…In the
future, to not allow this kind of problem to occur, I will
focus solely on my inspection duties...
Situation #4: A flight instructor with an air carrier
background had a “Good Grief” moment in a Cessna 152.
n …Entered left traffic pattern from training area. Student
flying in left seat. Tower cleared us for the option 4R.
Acknowledged clearance. Student stated she did not clearly
hear Tower, so I repeated Tower clearance to 4R. Then made a
nice pattern to touch and go on 4L. On the go Tower advised
us our clearance was to 4R. My answer was ‘Good grief!’
No other traffic in the patterns or on the surface. Beautiful
CAVU morning, very light quartering tailwind, familiar
with airport, etc.
Possible causes: I think I must have been expecting 4L
from the initial callup/startup because this is the usual
procedure, but I heard and repeated 4R. Most terrible
example to the student. Student not yet soloed, and still in
the trusting-the-instructor-for-everything stage.
I am a high-time airline pilot who does not fly much VFR
at all and lands off an ILS on almost every approach…
Somehow I managed to negate years of training and
experience to make such a serious mistake…To add to the
embarrassment, this student and I had recently attended
a FAAST [FAA Safety Team] presentation on runway
incursions and such at our home airport.
Student Over-Reliance on the Instructor
Situation #5: During flight training, the instructor is Pilot
in Command and is expected to take control of the aircraft
if an emergency occurs. In such cases, the student should
assist the instructor as requested and provide needed
back-up. Here’s a report of what happened when a Piper
Turbo Seminole lost an engine, and both the student and
instructor became preoccupied with the approach.
n We were at 4,500 feet MSL. My flight instructor was
demonstrating engine-out procedures. We shut down the
left engine and feathered the propeller. We maneuvered
the aircraft for a few minutes on one engine. Then we
　
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