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corresponding to a relative acceleration of 36 g of the rudder in relation to the
vertical stabilizer.
Breaking of
the right-hand
attachment of
arm 36 g
Front
Arm 36 g, right view: failure of the rudder attachments
Shear cracks, along a top-down axis, can also be seen on the rudder hinge arm
attachment fittings close to arm 36 g.
These observations indicate that the vertical stabiliser was subjected to a load
greater than 120,000 N in the rudder’s hinge axis.
1.12.3.5.5 Examination of the Rudder Travel Limiter Unit (RTLU)
The RTLU was found in its place in the fin and disassembled. An examination
was performed at the manufacturer’s and showed that it would allow travel
of the rudder measured as 7.9° +/- 0.1°. As an example, at FL350, this travel is
obtained for Mach 0.8 +/- 0.004, corresponding to a CAS of 272 +/- 2 kt.
Note: the maximum travel of the rudder is calculated in relation to the airplane
confi guration, its speed and its Mach number. This travel can be commanded between 4
degrees and 35 degrees.
F-GZCP - 1st June 2009
27
1.12.3.5.6 Examination of the fuselage parts (remains of the skin, frames and
web frames)
The fuselage was sheared along the frames and centre and aft attachment
lugs by loads applied bottom-upwards.
Frame 87: shearing of the frame and fuselage skin along the frame
Right-hand aft lug: shearing of the fuselage along main frames 86-87
The part of frame 87 that can be seen had undergone S-shaped deformation:
the left-hand side forwards, and the right-hand side backwards. The horizontal
stabiliser actuator supports were deformed and broke in a backwards
movement from the front. These observations indicate a backwards movement
of the trimmable horizontal stabiliser.
F-GZCP - 1st June 2009
28
Forward
S-shaped
deformation of
frame 87
Frames 84 to 87: S-shaped deformation of frame 87,
with frames 84 and 85 pushed in backwards
Frames 86 and 87: failure of the horizontal stabiliser actuator supports
Frames 84 and 85 were pushed in backwards in the middle. The deformations
observed on the rudder control rod are consistent with this indentation.
The deformations of the frames were probably the consequence of the water
braking the aircraft’s forward movement.
F-GZCP - 1st June 2009
29
Deformations of the rudder control rod consistent with the backwards indentation of frame 84
1.12.3.5.7 Examination of the fin-to-fuselage attachments
The centre attachment had pivoted backwards with the parts of the frames
and web frames that were attached to it. The aft attachment had pivoted
forwards with the parts of the frames and web frames that were attached to it.
Front
Fin centre and aft attachments
The aft attachment lugs (male on the fin and female on the airframe) had
marks indicating a backwards movement of frames 86 and 87 as a whole.
F-GZCP - 1st June 2009
30
Rear view of the left-hand aft lug: there were marks showing a backwards pivoting
of frames 86 and 87
The centre and aft lateral load pick-up rods showed damage that was consistent
with this backwards pivoting of frames 84 to 87:
 tensile failure of the centre spar at the level of the centre rod attachments;
 compression failure of the aft spar at the level of the aft rod attachments
and failure of the left-hand rod by buckling.
Tensile failure of the centre spar at the level of the attachment of the lateral load pick-up rods
F-GZCP - 1st June 2009
31
Compression failure of the aft spar at the level of the attachments of the lateral load pick-up
rods and failure of the left-hand rod by buckling
1.12.4 Summary
The cabin crew’s seatbelts that were found (three out of eleven) were not in
use at the moment of impact.
The containers recovered closed showed that the passenger oxygen masks
had not been released. There had been no cabin depressurisation.
Note: Depressurisation means pressure inside the cabin corresponding to an altitude of
more than 14,000 ft.
The flaps were retracted at the time of impact with water.
The vertical stabiliser’s side panels did not show signs of compression damage.
The breaks seen at the level of the lateral load pick-up rods were the result of
the backwards movement of the attachments and centre and aft frames. The
observations made on the vertical stabiliser are not consistent with a failure
due to lateral loads in flight.
The observations made on the debris (toilet doors, partitions, galleys, cabin
crew rest module, spoiler, aileron, vertical stabiliser) evidenced high rates of
compression resulting from a high rate of descent at the time of impact with
　
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