曝光臺 注意防騙 網曝天貓店富美金盛家居專營店坑蒙拐騙欺詐消費者

Significant points following the analysis of these 13 events of losses or
indicated speed anomalies
In the cases studied, it is notable that:
 the airplane remained within its flight envelope during these relatively
short events;
 the FD remained connected;
 the auto-thrust had been disconnected before the anomalies in one case.
In the other cases, either the autothrust remained connected, or the thrust
lock function remained active several dozen seconds before the manual
adjustment on the thrust.
Crew Reactions
This type of anomaly most of the time leads the AP to disengage, the FD to
disappear, the autothrust to pass to thrust lock and the airplane to switch
flight controls to alternate law.
The pilot flying gives priority to piloting the airplane and to the airplane flight
path, by maintaining a cruise attitude or by performing a descent to increase
the margins for evolution within the flight envelope. The descent can also be
decided following the triggering of the stall warning.
(12)This is the
name of the
Airbus procedure.
Air France uses
the term “IAS
douteuse“.
(13)Air France
uses the term
“manoeuvre
d’urgence“.
F-GZCP - 1st June 2009
53
The reappearance of the flight directors on the PFD when two air speeds will
be calculated that can lead the crew to rapidly engage the autopilot. However,
these speeds, though of the same order, can be erroneous and weak and thus
lead the autopilot to command movements of the flight control surfaces that
are inappropriate for the real speed of the airplane.
In case of automatic disconnection of the autothrust with activation of the
thrust lock function, the absence of appropriate manual adjustment of thrust
can present a risk of an attitude/thrust mismatch, especially when this
disconnection occurs with a low N1 value.
Stall warning
Nine cases of triggering of the stall warning were observed.
Note : the manufacturer’s additional abnormal STALL warning procedure is included in
appendix 5.
The stall warning triggers when the angle of attack passes a variable threshold
value. All of these warnings are explicable by the fact that the airplane is in
alternate law at cruise mach and in turbulent zones. Only one case of triggering
was caused by clear inputs on the controls.
Note: At high altitude, the stall warning triggers in alternate law on approach to the stall.
The stall manifests itself particularly through vibrations.
1.17 Information on Organisations and Management
1.17.2.4 Operator training for the Unreliable IAS / ADR check emergency /
backup procedure
The OPS 1 requires that operators train their crews in annual training courses.
This training, made up of briefings and simulator exercises includes regulatory
exercises and additional exercises at the choice of the airline.
In this context Air France had introduced into its 2008/2009 training
programme, a briefing on anomalies in airspeed indications for all phases
of flight accompanied by practical exercises on a simulator, on climb shortly
after take-off.
Note: In the Flight Crew Training Manual (FCTM) dated January 2005, the manufacturer
describes the condition in which speed anomalies occur and the QRH unreliable airspeed/
ADR check procedure to apply when crews are confronted with this.
The Air France training module on A330 for the instruction season running
from 1st April 2008 to 31 March 2009 includes a UAS exercise. Extracts from
the A330/A340 Periodic Training/Examination briefings handbook are given
in appendix 6.
This handbook serves as a supplement to the analytical instruction programme
that describes the sequence of exercises and checks. It is issued to the trainee
pilots to help them in their preparatory work. The Operating Manual remains
the only regulatory reference work.
F-GZCP - 1st June 2009
54
Note: The introduction to the UAS topic(14) in this briefi ngs booklet mentions losses
of control on conventional aircraft further to the non-detection of incorrect speed
indications by the crew.
It then says that on A330, saving exceptional special circumstances, a failure
or incorrect information will be presented by the ECAM ,and the FMGEC
computers will reject the ADRs delivering the incorrect speeds/altitudes.
In the exceptional case where the incorrect speeds are not rejected, the
flight control and guidance computers use the two incorrect ADRs for their
calculations. In this case the crew will have to:
 Trigger the emergency manoeuvre(15) if they consider control of the flight
is dangerously affected (initial climb, go-around, etc.);
　
中國航空網 www.k6050.com
航空翻譯 www.aviation.cn
本文鏈接地址：航空資料5(77)