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about 4,000 and 14,000 ft;
 a CAS such as the difference between the total and static pressures being
lower than a given threshold. This case implies notably that the static
pressure is higher than the total pressure.
The “HARD” nature of the message indicates that the problem lasted longer
than 2 seconds.
ADIRU2 (1FP2) (2 h 11)
ATA: 341234
Source: IR2
Identifiers: *EFCS1, IR1, IR3
Class 1, HARD
F-GZCP - 1st June 2009
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This message was generated by IR 2. For an ADIRU of this standard, it means
that the IR considered that the three ADRs were invalid, that is to say that at
least one of the three parameters was invalid (SSM status not NO) amongst
pressure altitude, barometric vertical speed and true airspeed. As soon as the
third ADR is rejected, the IR generates a message pointing to its ADIRU. If one
of the IRs considers the three ADRs as being invalid, this must also be the
case for the other IRs. It is therefore logical that, in parallel with this ADIRU 2
message generated by IR 2, an ADIRU 1 message was generated by IR 1 and
an ADIRU 3 message by IR 3, which would explain the presence of the latter
amongst the identifiers.
The fact that EFCS1 was present amongst the identifiers preceded by an
asterisk indicates that EFCS1 had at least generated one class 2 message,
perhaps followed by a class 1 message. There are too few elements available
to determine precisely what the presence of EFCS1 amongst the identifiers
means. Nevertheless, it is possible to state that it concerns a rejection of ADR
by at least two PRIMs. It has not been possible at this stage to understand why
EFCS2, the clone of EFCS1, is not an identifier.
FMGEC1 (1CA1) (2 h 13)
ATA: 228334
Source: AFS
Identifiers: -
Class 1, INTERMITTENT
This message cannot be the trace of a reset which, in particular, excludes the
possibility of a manual shutdown. This message could be the consequence of
inconsistency between the two channels in the FMGEC (COM and MON). Such
an inconsistency could be the consequence of erratic input parameter values.
In any event, the effects of such a message could only be the disengagement
of automatic systems, whose associated cockpit effect messages had already
been transmitted at 2 h 10.
The “INTERMITTENT” nature of the message means that the problem lasted for
less than 2.5 seconds.
1.16.2.4.3. Interruption of the messages
The last ACARS message was received at 2 h 14 min 26. The traces of
the communications at the level of the satellite show that the ACARS
acknowledgement from the ground was effectively received by the aircraft.
No trace of any attempted communication by the aircraft with the ground was
then recorded, although there was still at least one message to be transmitted
(see above). In absolute terms, there are several reasons that could explain
why communications stopped.
 no message to be transmitted: as explained above, the “MAINTENANCE
STATUS ADR2” message should have been followed, one minute later, by
the transmission of a class 2 fault message. The aircraft therefore had, at
2 h 15 min 14 at the latest, one message to be transmitted.
F-GZCP - 1st June 2009
39
 loss of one or more system(s) essential for the generation and routing of
messages in the aircraft:
 ATSU / SDU / antenna: none of the maintenance messages sent is
related in any way whatsoever with the functioning of these systems. A
malfunction of this type should have occurred after the transmission of
the last message and without forewarning.
 loss of electrical power supply: this would imply the simultaneous loss of
the two main sources of electrical power generation.
 loss of satellite communication:
 loss of data during transmission: the satellite’s quality follow-up does
not show any malfunction in the time slot concerned.
 loss of contact between the aircraft and the satellite:
• unusual attitudes: given the relative position of the satellite with respect
to the aircraft and the aircraft’s tracking capability, the antenna would
have to be masked by the aircraft’s fuselage or wings. Examination of
the debris showed that the aircraft hit the water with a bank angle close
to zero and a positive pitch angle. The aircraft would therefore have
been able, in the last seconds at least, to transmit an ACARS message.
• end of the flight between 2 h 14 min 26 and 2 h 15 min 14.
F-GZCP - 1st June 2009
40
1.16.2.4.4. Correlation of the messages
Analysis of the maintenance messages makes it possible to group the fault
　
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