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 The elements identified came from all over the airplane,
 The oxygen masks had not been released; there had been no in-flight
depressurisation,
 All of the life jackets that were found were still in their containers,
 The airplane’s flaps were retracted at the time of the impact with the water,
 Three of the eleven cabin crew seats were found; they were not in use at the
time of the impact,
 Examination of all of the debris confirmed that the airplane struck the surface
of the water pitch-up, with a slight bank and at a high vertical speed,
 Analysis of thirteen previous events shows that:
 they occurred in air masses that were highly unstable and the seat of deep
convection phenomena;
 autopilot disengaged in all of the cases;
 the maximum continuous invalid recorded speed duration was three
minutes and twenty seconds;
 the uncommanded altitude variations remained within a range of more or
less one thousand feet,
 the airplane always remained within its flight envelope
 The probes that equipped F-GZCP met requirements that were stricter than
the certification standards,
 On 30 March 2009, analysis of previous events had not led EASA to make
mandatory a change of the probes on the Airbus A330 / A340 fleet.
F-GZCP - 1st June 2009
71
4 - RECOMMENDATIONS
4.1 Flight Recorders
The investigation into the accident to AF 447 confirms the importance of data
from the flight recorders in order to establish the circumstances and causes
of an accident and to propose safety measures that are substantiated by the
facts. As in other investigations, it also brings to light the difficulties that can
be encountered in localizing, recovering and reading out the recorders after
an accident in the sea.
These difficulties raise questions about the adequacy of the means currently
in use on civil transport aircraft for the protection of flight data with the
technological possibilities and the challenges that some accidents represent,
in particular those that occur over the sea. In the context of this investigation,
the BEA thus formed an international working group in order to examine the
various techniques that can be employed to safeguard flight data and/or to
facilitate localisation of the wreckage and recovery of the flight recorders. This
working group dedicated itself to analyzing each field as completely as possible,
from the transmission of flight data by satellite to new ULB technologies and
it settled on three additional areas for significant improvements in safety:
increasing the transmission time and range of the ULB beacons, the sending
of data on initialisation and the installation of deployable recorders. This work
was presented on 19 November 2009 to the ICAO Air Navigation Commission.
On the basis of this work, le BEA recommends that EASA and ICAO:
1. extend as rapidly as possible to 90 days the regulatory transmission
time for ULB’s installed on flight recorders on airplanes performing
public transport flights over maritime areas;
2. make it mandatory, as rapidly as possible, for airplanes performing
public transport flights over maritime areas to be equipped with
an additional ULB capable of transmitting on a frequency (for
example between 8.5 kHz and 9.5 kHz) and for a duration adapted
to the pre-localisation of wreckage;
3. study the possibility of making it mandatory for airplanes
performing public transport flights to regularly transmit basic
flight parameters (for example position, altitude, speed, heading).
In addition, the BEA recommends that ICAO:
4. ask the FLIRECP(19) group to establish proposals on the conditions
for implementing deployable recorders of the Eurocae ED-112
type for airplanes performing public transport flights.
(19)Flight Recorder
Panel.
F-GZCP - 1st June 2009
72
4.2 Certification
Examination of reported UAS events in cruise has shown that the majority
of them occurred outside of the envelope defined in Appendix C. In fact, the
certification criteria are not representative of the conditions that are really
encountered at high altitude, for example with regard to temperatures. In
addition, it appears that some elements, such as the size of the ice crystals
within cloud masses, are little known and that it is consequently difficult to
evaluate the effect that they may have on some equipment, in particular the
Pitot probes. In this context, the tests aimed at the validation of this equipment
do not appear to be well-adapted to flights at high altitude.
Consequently, the BEA recommends that EASA :
　
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