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 Ian Mitroff and Elizabeth Denton, A Spiritual Audit of Corporate America: A Hard Look at Spirituality, Religion and
Values in the Workplace (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1999).
 John Byrne, Chainsaw: The Notorious Career of Al Dunlap in the Era of Profit-at-any-Price (1999).
 Patricia Werhane, Moral Imagination and Management Decision-making (Oxford University Press, 1999).
13
Class 6, Strategy in High-Velocity Environments: Intended vs. Emergent Strategy
Class Overview (Approximate)
Time Topic/Activity
8 - 8:45 1999 Seattle WTO Research
8:45 - 9:45 Capturing the Returns to Technological Innovation
* Standard Setting & Complementary Assets
* Challenge to America (1994) video - difficulty in capturing R&D returns, 15 minutes
Break
10 - noon Intel’s Decision to Exit DRAM Business
* Creative Destruction, Emergent Strategy & Leadership
Class Readings :
Reading Availability
David Teece, “Profiting from Technological Innovation,” Research Policy, 15
(1986): 285-92; and 298-300.
www.study.net
Schnietz, Note on Innovation & Imitation in VCR Industry Blackboard class e-room
Schnietz, Note on Intended vs. Emergent Strategy - Intel’s Exit from the
DRAM Market.
Blackboard class e-room
Questions:
1. What is an “appropriability regime” -- other than a big buzzword (Teece)? Why didn’t Ampex’s patents
on early VTR technology ensure that it reaped all future returns on its innovation? Why are
complementary assets often critical to profiting from innovation in products and technologies where
patent protection is weak? What critical complementary asset did EMI lack?
2. What are examples of some products or technologies in the “pre-paradigmatic” stage? Why did the VHS
standard become the dominant design in tape?
3. What is the relevance of “specialized” versus “generic” complementary assets for strategy? How do they
relate to last time’s discussion of cooperative arrangements?
4. When it was first founded, what were Intel’s main resources and capabilities? How tightly linked was its
intended strategy to its competitive advantage? Does this change over the course of the case?
5. What should Intel do with respect to its DRAM business in 1984? Should Intel invest in a new 1M
DRAM plant, license the 1M technology to another firm to produce to remain a niche player in DRAMs
or exit DRAM production entirely? What are the other pros and cons of each alternative? Why is it so
difficult for Intel to see itself as something other than a memory chip maker?
6. Was Intel “lucky” at all during the course of this case? How so? What was the role of leadership and
corporate culture in implementing Intel’s strategy during its first 15 years?
Further Readings (Recommended not required):
 Alfred Chandler, Inventing the Electronic Century: Epic Story of the Consumer Electronics and Computer Industries
(2001).
David Kearns and David Nadler, Prophets in the Dark: How Xerox Reinvented itself and Beat Back the Japanese (1992).
Michael Lewis, The New, New Thing: A Silicon Valley Story (Norton, 2000).
Harold Evans, They Made America: Two Centuries of Innovation from the Steam Engine to the Search Engine (1994),
profiles 53 top US innovators.
14
Class 7, Globalization, International Diversification & Political Risk and Sim Practice
Class Overview (Approximate)
Time Topic/Activity
8 - 8:30 Overview of the Appeal of Emerging Economies and the Problem of Political Risk
8:30 – 9:30 Russian Oil Industry Case
Break
9:45 – noon Simulation Preparation
 Simulation Strategic Plan Overview
 Practice Sim Runs (in class with school-issued laptop computers)
Class Readings :
Reading Availability
Schnietz, Note on Political Risk and Foreign Market Entry Blackboard class e-room
“Russia Slaps Big Tax on BP Venture,” Wall St J, 4-12-05: A3. Blackboard class e-room
White Nights and Polar Lights: Investing in the Russian Oil Industry,
Harvard Business School Case No. 9-795-022.
www.study.net
www.hbsp.harvard.edu
Questions:
1. What’s political risk and why is it important to firms considering investments abroad,
particularly in emerging markets (Note)? How do various modes of foreign market entry mitigate
political risk (Note)? What kind of political risk is being illustrated in the WSJ article?
2. Evaluate the entry strategies of the three US firms with respect to managing the risks of
investing in the Russian Oil industry (case). What “smart” moves did each firm make to cope with
　
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