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[B16] The application of the CONTESSE Framework to a Marine Roll and Stabilisation System, + C.
Project number: 9021 Approx. Project Cost: £2.3m Start date: Jan 1992 End date: Jun 1995
EPSRC Grant number: h12287
Advances in Safety Critical Systems - Results and Achievements from the DTI/EPSRC R&D Programme. Compiled and edited by Mike Falla.
7
COPSE Cognitive and Organisational Factors in Software Engineering
Divisions of Computer Science and Psychology, University
of Hertfordshire
'Uncles': BNR Europe, Harlow, Essex;
Signal Computing, Guildford, Surrey
Contact: Donald Ridley,
Division of Psychology, University of Hertfordshire,
Hatfield, Herts, AL10 9AB
Tel: 0707-284610 Fax: 0707-285073
Email: PSYQDR@HERTS.AC.UK
Summary
COPSE has antecedents in two different areas. The first of these is the widely acknowledged but unformalised
deficiencies of the lifecycle model. The second is the influence of organisational influences on individual cognitive
processing, group behaviour and management performance involved in the design and operation of safety critical
systems. COPSE brings together these two separate stands in an evaluation of the impact of the lifecycle model on
software design process for safety critical systems. The objectives of the project are to characterise the impact of
organisational influences of various kinds on the performance of the lifecycle model, and the impact of the lifecycle
model on individual and group planning activity in software engineering.
Anticipated deliverables include a review of the literature, a safety culture assessment methodology, a case study
and other related publications.
Findings include
(a) The need for a dual culture of compliance and innovation in software design teams
(b) Formal methods and quality procedures that are over rigorous either inhibit the design process or cause a
decoupling of quality systems and design activity.
(c) Management of the design ‘process’ is an activity that is under-addressed and undervalued
(d) Domain knowledge is frequently lacking in those responsible for coding and design of software.
(e) Group processes destroy formal approaches to software design (e.g. the lifecycle model) because they are
inappropriate for the type of activity, do not reflect normal working practices, lead to illusions of progress
rather than actual progress.
(f) Inter-organisational factors impair communication and so efficacious project implementation.
(g) It appears that ‘safety culture’ or safety awareness is often lacking in the software design teams for safety
critical systems.
No further information about this project was available at the time of going to press. For further details, please
contact Dr Ridley at the address above.
Project number: 9320 Approx. Project Cost: £0.1m Start date: Jan 1994 End date: Dec 1996
EPSRC Grant number: j20234
Advances in Safety Critical Systems - Results and Achievements from the DTI/EPSRC R&D Programme. Compiled and edited by Mike Falla.
8
DATUM Dependability Assessment of safety-critical systems Through the Unification of Measurable evidence
City University
Centre for Software Reliability
Centre for Human Computer Interface
Royal Holloway College
Lloyd’s Register of Shipping
Contact: Professor Norman Fenton
Centre for Software Reliability, City University
Northampton Square
London EC1V OHB
Tel: 0171 477 8425 Fax: 0171 477 8585
Email: n.e.fenton@csr.city.ac.uk
Summary
The objectives of this project were:
· to advance the state of the art in assessing and predicting the dependability of systems by combining diverse
sources of relevant information;
· to help developers determine how different development methods and system architectures contribute to the
overall dependability argument.
The objectives lead to two key research themes:
1 How to represent and reason about uncertainty from diverse sources of information;
2 Identifying the key sources of information necessary for dependability assessment.
In (1) the project considered formalisms like Bayesian probability, the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence, the
fuzzy set based possibility theory, and measurement theory. In (2) they addressed the process of specifying safety
requirements; the human factors issues that contribute to the reliability of system design and operational failures; the
contribution of formal methods to safety; the range of product and process information that can be quantified. The
themes are linked by two industrial case studies of safety related systems.
For a more detailed description see section 4.3, Combining diverse evidence, section 7.2, Analysing human error,
　
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