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According to his statement, the pilot in command informed the ground maintenance
personnel about the incidence during the landing and it was commented that the problem
would be consulted with the operator’s main base in Madrid.
According to their statement, the maintenance personnel entered the cockpit and saw
the high brake temperature caution and observed in the post-flight report that there
had been a caution of «Brakes residual braking». They tried to test the BSCU 1 and 2
but they were unable to do that.
The information gathered shows that while the maintenance personnel were trying to
locate technical advice in the Madrid base, the passenger boarding of next flight Tenerife-
Madrid started, with the same flight crew that had flown the previous leg.
Some information was interchanged with the pilot in command, who understood that
the maintenance personnel had no inconvenience for the starting of the flight back to
Madrid. However, these personnel were still considering the possibility of lifting the left
MLG to check the free movement of the wheels, although in the end this action was
not carried out because during the previous taxi to the apron the wheels seemed to
have behaved correctly.
Once the boarding ended, a person from maintenance Madrid called the line maintenance
Tenerife and was informed about the situation. Since in the ECAM screen there
was no caution, and the brake temperature had fallen within normal limits, this conversation
did not produce further maintenance actions and therefore the doors were
closed and the aircraft started the taxi for takeoff.
The maintenance personnel advised the pilot in command to watch the temperature
during the taxi just in case a new cooling was needed. The aircraft taxied normally, and
the pilot in command informed that after the takeoff he would leave the landing gear
down for some minutes to further cool it.
In the aircraft logbook the crew did not write any squawk after the landing in Tenerife.
The maintenance personnel wrote that the normal «transit» line check was comple-
3
Technical report IN-062/2002
ted, but they did not report any of the actions carried out on the brake system. Neither
in that flight nor in next flight (Tenerife-Madrid where the incident happened) was the
aircraft acceptance form signed by the pilot in command.
1.1.3. Flight Tenerife Norte-Madrid
The aircraft, with the flight identifier IB-0959, took off around 10:55 h from Tenerife,
after a taxi of 5 min since the moment of chocks off during which the general behaviour
of the aircraft was checked and it was confirmed that no new cautions appeared.
The takeoff was normal, with a weight of 173404 kg, compared with the maximum
takeoff weight of 275000 kg. There were 247 passengers and 12 crew members on
board.
The brake temperatures were still slightly high, and therefore the crew left the landing
gear down for several minutes after lift-off.
The flight progressed normally. The crew did not show excessive concern with respect
to the reappearance of the failure in Madrid.
At 12:58:02 h, with the landing gear still up, the copilot called the WHEEL page of the
ECAM and they saw again the there was residual pressure in the brakes of the left MLG,
because the bars that represented the brakes appeared again in amber colour. The crew
disconnected and then connected the BSCU but the amber bars did not disappear.
At 12:58:38 h landing gear down was selected, the system started its normal self-checks
and the residual pressure disappeared momentarily but almost immediately appeared
again. The crew again disconnected during 24 s and then connected the BSCU,
although this action, not permitted by the operational procedures when the landing
gear is extended, did not succeed in eliminating the residual pressure indication.
Since the moment they noticed there was residual pressure in the left leg, both pilots
were commenting the possible actions to be taken. It was discussed the possibility of
discontinuing the approach, and it was commented that the only solution would be to
disconnect the antiskid because in that case the system was not going to brake by itself,
and, therefore, to lock the wheels.
Finally, the copilot disconnected the antiskid system and nose wheel steering switch
after asking the pilot in command for conformity.
The aircraft continued its approach to runway 33 of Madrid-Barajas Airport with the
pilot in command acting as PF. The aircraft configuration was flaps down and landing
Technical report IN-062/2002
4
gear down, without autopilot but with autothrust connected, and with the antiskid and
the autobrake off. The spoilers had not been armed during the approach.
　
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