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was approved and passed safely clear of the storm activity.
Moments later the commander of G-MIDJ transmitted to Budapest ATC informing them that they
were unable to maintain FL340 due to severe turbulence. He was unable to hear the reply because of
the hail. This also prevented the pilots from hearing each other for, although they were wearing
headsets, it is normal practice for the intercom to be selected OFF and cross-cockpit conversation to be
conducted without the use of intercom.
After the aircraft cleared the area of turbulence and hail associated with the storm cell the pilots
noticed that the left front (commander's) windscreen and the right (first officer's) Direct Vision (DV)
window had sustained severe hail damage. The commander felt his windscreen and noted that,
although there were visible signs of damage to the outer layers and an increase in airflow noise, the
inside layer was undamaged but the heating had failed. The only caption displayed on the Electronic
Central Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM) system indicated that the aircraft's ILS status had been
downgraded to Category (CAT) III single only. The commander therefore referred to the Quick
Reference Handbook (QRH) for the procedure to deal with a 'cracked windshield'. This required a
descent to FL230 or below and a maximum cabin differential pressure of 5 psi. Budapest ATC
instructed the crew to contact Austrian Radar for their descent clearance and although only 'even'
levels (FL240, FL220) are normally available for westbound flights on this route, the aircraft was
cleared to the requested level of FL230. The aircraft descended gently at 1,500 feet per minute and, in
accordance with the QRH procedure, the pressurisation was controlled manually. During the descent
the Cabin Service Director (CSD) reported to the commander that everyone in the cabin was secure
and that there were no injuries. The commander explained that the situation was still being assessed
and an appropriate course of action considered.
The flight crew interrogated the system pages of the ECAM and noted that the engines appeared
undamaged as individual engine vibration levels had not been affected as a result of the incident. The
aircraft's fuel state had been checked approximately 20 minutes prior to the incident and at that time
there had been an excess of 900 kg over the flight requirements. The aircraft appeared to have
suffered only windscreen damage and the crew confirmed that at the lower cruising level of FL230
there was still sufficient fuel available to complete the flight. With sufficient fuel and no indication of
the aircraft being unsafe the crew elected to continue to Manchester and informed ATC that they had
damaged windscreens and would maintain FL230. Frequent monitoring of the fuel available against
that required by the flight plan and the Flight Management Guidance System (FMGS) confirmed that
sufficient fuel was available to land at Manchester with more than the minimum fuel required.
When the crew contacted London ATCC they re-confirmed that the aircraft had damaged
windscreens. They were radar vectored for a CAT I ILS approach to Runway 24R at Manchester
where the PF was able to carry out a normal manual landing, having disconnected the AP at
approximately 800 feet on finals. The commander was able to monitor the approach even though his
windscreen was significantly crazed. The FO taxied the aircraft to the stand where, as was normal
procedure for that stand, the commander was able to park the aircraft under the guidance of a
marshaller. The passengers exited the aircraft normally using steps positioned at doors L2 and L4.
It was not until the crew vacated the aircraft that they were aware of the extent and severity of the
damage to other areas of the airframe. Even though the manufacturer later confirmed that the aircraft
was in a safe condition to continue to its destination the commander stated that had he known the full
extent of the damage he would have diverted after the incident to the nearest suitable airfield.
Airbus A321-231, G-MIDJ
5
Meteorology
The synoptic situation at 1500 hrs on 26 May 2003 showed a frontal system lying from Poland to
Switzerland with a potentially very unstable airmass to the east of the frontal boundary. Isolated
Cumulo-nimbus clouds, with tops up to approximately FL400, were over the area around eastern
Austria, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia with associated hail, icing and turbulence. A ridge of
high pressure was situated over the southern half of the British Isles with a weak warm front
approaching England and Wales from the west.
The original written weather forecast, obtained by the crew prior to the flight, was not required to be
retained after landing and was not available for scrutiny. A copy of the relevant Significant Weather
　
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