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chart, obtained from the Meteorological Office, however, is shown at Figure 1. This indicates isolated
(ISOL) embedded (EMBD) Cb cloud with tops up to approximately FL300 over the Alps. It should
be noted that the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) standard specifies that only
EMBD Cb and occasional (OCNL) Cb or more, but not isolated ISOL Cb, should be depicted on the
chart.
Figure 1: Significant Weather Chart
Airbus A321-231, G-MIDJ
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Satellite information
Airbus A321-231, G-MIDJ
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Satellite images of the cold front showing the weather and Cb activity are shown at Figure 2 with the
approximate aircraft track indicated.
Figure 2: Satellite images
Airbus A321-231, G-MIDJ
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The radar picture
The actual weather radar picture seen by the crew is not recorded and therefore cannot be reproduced.
A representative drawing from the crew of G-MIDJ, illustrating the radar returns they remembered
seeing on their display some time before the incident, is shown on the left below. (Note: the crew
reported that they thought the tilt was set between 2º and 3º down at this time).
Figure 3: Representative drawing from the crew of G-MIDJ
The commander of the 757, who had his weather radar and TCAS selected ON and was using the tilt
function of the scanner, saw on his display the TCAS return from the aircraft ahead and the weather
radar returns. He was able to recollect the display at the time and an illustration of that display is
shown on the right above.
Flight Recorders
The Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) and Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) were removed from
the aircraft and replayed at the AAIB.
Cockpit voice recorder
The CVR (2 hour duration) contained only a 30 minute recording of the incident flight as electrical
ground power continued to be supplied to the unit after landing, over-writing some of the pertinent
recording. The CVR however, confirmed that the first officer was the PF and that the hail damage
had rendered the commander's windscreen crazed. The only other matter of note on the recording was
an increase in cockpit ambient noise level after the hail encounter.
Digital flight data recorder
The DFDR contained a time history of the entire flight and showed that the aircraft took off at
1300 hrs and climbed steadily towards its cruising altitude. Two hours and twelve minutes into the
cruise the DFDR recorded a severe turbulence encounter (see Figure 3) that lasted in excess of
3 minutes causing disturbances in all aircraft axes. The most severe disturbances were in the 'pitch'
and in the 'normal' axes. Recordings during the encounter showed a maximum nose down pitch
attitude of -15o and a normal acceleration ranging between +1.5 g and -0.3 g. The aircraft descended
to FL230 six minutes after the encounter and remained at this flight level until its descent into
Manchester. The aircraft landed normally, with the first officer at the controls, at 1803 hrs.
Airbus A321-231, G-MIDJ
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Figure 4: DFDR Trace for G-MIDJ
Airbus A321-231, G-MIDJ
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Airbus A321-231, G-MIDJ
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Weather radar data
Recorded data concerning the use of the weather radar (see Figure 4) showed that it was switched on
and displayed to the first officer for approximately 12 minutes as the aircraft climbed from 4,700 feet
through 23,600 feet. The DFDR did not record any use of the weather radar during the remainder of
the flight.
Figure 5: DFDR Trace for G-MIDJ
Airbus A321-231, G-MIDJ
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Airbus A321-231, G-MIDJ
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After the aircraft had been repaired AAIB inspectors, with the assistance of the operator's engineers,
carried out a full operational check of the weather radar and its recording on the DFDR. The DFDR
data was downloaded after the check and analysis confirmed that the DFDR faithfully recorded the
use of the weather radar. It should be noted however that the data recording was not confirmed post
incident before major repair work had been undertaken and some radar components had
been replaced.
Passenger cabin activity`
In the aircraft cabin, which was in a 'Charter' configuration, were 213 passengers and 6 cabin crew,
including a Cabin Service Director (CSD), working with two crew in the forward cabin and three in
the aft cabin area. Although the outbound flight had been uneventful the aircraft commander had
warned the cabin crew, at their initial briefing, that they could experience some turbulence during the
outbound sector of the flight.
The incident
Immediately prior to the incident, the cabin crew were positioned with three in the forward galley,
two in the aft galley and one who had just commenced moving forward through the cabin. The meal
　
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