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and also the heating (sometimes with a negative influence in the dispatch of the aircraft).
Therefore, in certain occasions it was intended to limit the use of this system by
crews in runways with enough length.
After the incident, the operator required the use of autobrake in the procedure of the
Operations Manual (2.01.63) in the event residual pressure was detected after lowering
the landing gear.
Although there is no requirement for the Operations Manual of an operator is completely
identical to the procedures recommended by the manufacturer, in this case, given
the fact that both aspects could have influenced the outcome of the incident, it is
recommended that the manufacturer clarifies whether or not a reset of the BSCU should
be performed on ground when the caution is displayed. The operator should then adapt
their Operations Manual to the conditions established by the manufacturer in this matter
and also regarding the use of autobrake.
Technical report IN-062/2002
52
3. CONCLUSIONS
3.1. Findings
1. The pilots had valid licenses and were adequately qualified for the flight.
2. During the descent to Madrid-Barajas Airport the residual pressure of the left brakes
alternate system started increasing when the aircraft was at approximately
13000 ft of altitude and it reached 800 psi when the aircraft was at approximately
500 ft of radio-altitude, at 13:02:45 h.
3. During the approach to Madrid-Barajas Airport, before lowering the landing gear,
the crew observed in the corresponding page of the ECAM that there was residual
pressure on the brakes of the left leg and, in absence of a procedure to be
applied, switched off and then on the BSCU. Afterwards, they selected landing
gear down and, with the gear down and locked, switched off the BSCU for 24 s
and then switched it back on. They observed that there was still residual pressure
on the brakes of the left leg, and disconnected again the BSCU moving the
switch A/SKID & N/W STRG to the «OFF» position.
4. During the landing on runway 33 of Madrid-Barajas Airport the spoilers were not
armed.
5. The aircraft touched down with the left and right legs of the MLG at approximately
240 m past the threshold of runway 33, at 13:03:27 h. After three seconds,
thrust reversers were selected, they worked normally, and the spoilers started
deploying.
6. The PF applied right rudder, without pressing the brake pedals, during the first 18
s of the landing roll.
7. Between 240 m and 900 m past the threshold of runway 33 the wheels of the
left MLG burst because they were already locked when the aircraft touched down.
8. At 13:03:45 h, the right brake pedal was fully deflected (68°) and the pressure of
the brakes alternate system increased up to 2500 psi, when the aircraft was
approximately 70 m past the intersection of runway 33 with runway 36R.
9. At 73 m past that intersection there were track markings on the runway indicating
that the wheels of the right leg bust in this area because they were blocked
by the pressure of 2500 psi applied with the right pedal.
10. The eight wheels of the left and right legs of the MLG burst because of friction
with the runway surface. The tire rims 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 showed signs of rubbing
53
Technical report IN-062/2002
with loss of material by friction with the runway surface. The brake assemblies 1,
5 and 6 showed heavy rubbing with loss of material of the casing and the disks
by friction with the runway surface.
11. There had been 5 complaints that referred to appearance of residual pressure in
flight within 7-6-2002 and 11-6-2002 that were not notified to the manufacturer.
There had also been several reports of residual pressure in other A-340 registered
EC-GUP in November 2001, which had been notified to the manufacturer.
12. The aircraft made on 7 September 2002 its first flight since 28 July 2002, when
it had suffered a bird impact and was subject to the corresponding repair.
13. The master cylinder, P/N C 24592020, S/N H2121, was the component that produced
the residual pressure in flight. This cylinder had a length of 170.31 mm,
which was 0.21 mm longer than specified. The dead travel of the cylinder (before
being installed on the aircraft) was 0.08 mm longer than the value specified.
The ultimate subcomponent inside the master cylinder that was causing the residual
pressure could not be determined.
14. The Operations Manual of the operator, and the Standard Operational Procedures
(SOP) of the manufacturer, did not contain procedures to be followed in the
event residual pressure was observed in flight. Both manuals specified that if the
antiskid system was inoperative, the braking is carried out with the alternate
　
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