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Final Report
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AVIATION COMMITTEE
50
1.15. Fire
Based on the documents made available to the commission and the
testimonies of officials and eyewitnesses to the accident (including passengers
on this airplane), the circumstances surrounding the onset and development of
the situation that arose on board the airplane after it rolled off beyond the
runway and collided with the barriers were established, an approximate diagram
of how the fire broke out and spread in the airplane was drawn up, the use of onboard
emergency and rescue equipment and the actions of the cabin crew to
evacuate passengers were evaluated, and the actions of the emergency rescue
and fire services at the accident site were assessed.
At the time of the airplane's collision with the barriers (reinforced
concrete airport boundary fence and stone garages) there were 9,300 kg of TS-1
aviation fuel (including 0.8 t in the center wing section and 2.4 t in the inner
wing tanks), as well as hydraulic fluid from the hydraulic system, oxygen
system and electrical batteries.
The airplane was not de-energized before the collision. The airplane's
forward velocity was significant (at the time it slid off the runway its speed was
180 kph).
The airplane caught fire at the moment the nose section of the fuselage hit
the barrier (22:44:40). The fire gained strength as the fuel pipes were destroyed
when the left section of the wing broke off from the center wing section.
The airplane was de-energized about 5 seconds after the collision, which
extinguished the lights in the passenger cabins.
Aviation fuel spilled under the fuselage and inside it, under the floor and
inside the passenger cabin. This facilitated the rapid spreading of the fire along
the entire length of the airplane.
Entry doors (forward left and right) and a section of the skin were
destroyed. A powerful fire centre formed under the floor of the entrance way.
The flight attendant, who was responsible for the left entry door, was
separated from the passengers by the destroyed structure of the fuselage and the
fire. The floor under her was destroyed and she was suspended by her fastened
seat belts. After unfastening the belts, she fell to the ground from a height of
about 3 m, and received burns to her arms and legs. She did not take part in the
evacuation of passengers. The flight attendant who was sitting by the right door
and was in the area where the fire broke out, died, most probably during the first
seconds after the onset of the fire because of "acute carbon monoxide
poisoning", as the forensic medical examination concluded.
This means that the forward entry doors were not used to evacuate
passengers.
The central emergency exit doors were served by two flight attendants.
The left door could not be opened since a powerful fire centre with a very
high temperature had formed under it. Another flight attendant died here.
Final Report
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AVIATION COMMITTEE
51
The right door was opened by another flight attendant, ensuring the evacuation
of passengers on to the right wing which was on the roofs of the garages.
The exits in the tail section of the airplane were served by two flight
attendants.
The right rear door and flight attendant, who was sitting near it, ended up
being blocked by metal food containers that had fallen as a result of the
airplane's collision with the barriers.
The flight attendant who opened the left rear door released the emergency
inflatable escape chute, thus ensuring a route for evacuating passengers.
The inflatable chute opened but was damaged by sharp metal objects on
the ground and lost its load-bearing capacity.
Another flight attendant, after freeing herself from the metal containers,
helped in the evacuation of passengers through the left rear door.
Another flight attendant, while helping passengers inside the cabin, died
from acute carbon monoxide poisoning.
Some passengers from business class and the first compartment of the
economy class evacuated through gaps that formed along the right sidewall of
the fuselage as a result of its deformation.
The relentless spread of the fire in the lower section of the fuselage and
along the skin of the upper part of the passenger cabins, the high concentration
of combustion products, the smoke, darkness and panic that broke out among
passengers greatly hindered the evacuation of passengers.
It was established that from about 22:44:45 to 22:45:50 67 people
were evacuated by members of the cabin crew.
During the course of the investigation it was established that the fire and
rescue detail of airport fire vehicle AA-40(43105)-189, located with the fire
　
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