曝光臺 注意防騙 網(wǎng)曝天貓店富美金盛家居專營店坑蒙拐騙欺詐消費者

that was furthest from him. With regard to the airplane of the Bangladeshi
airline, it could not be clarified which of the pilots performed the actual piloting.
It should also be noted that these events happened with airplane with P&W
engines and GE engines, which involve significantly large forces required to
shift the TCL.
Incidents on other types of airplane
According to the information provided by the NTSB the following
incidents in fairly similar circumstances (increasing the forward thrust of an
engine whose reverser was not used) were recorded on various occasions.
№ in
order
Date Place Operator Type of
airplane
1 April 6, 1987 Rio-de-Janeiro,
Brazil
Varig Airlines В-747-300
2 September 12,
1988
Denver, USA United Airlines DC-10
3 November 5,
2000
Paris, France Cameroon Air B-747-200
4 December 19,
2003
Libreville, Gabon Air Gabon B-737-30
5 December 14,
2005
McGuire AFB Atlas Air B-747-2D7
A short description of the above-mentioned events is given below.
1. After landing on runway 14, the airplane departed the righthand
side of the runway and came to stop with its nose gear
and right-hand main gear on grass on a heading 15 degrees to
the right of the runway. The pilot stated that no.1 engine
would not go into reverse and then accelerated no.1 to 100%,
causing airplane to twist to the right. He shut down the
Final Report
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AVIATION COMMITTEE
76
engine. No anomalies were found in the reverser or engine
systems.
2. At about 2pm, the DC-10 landed at Denver Stapleton. The
weather was overcast with wet runways. After touchdown
the crew attempted to apply reverse thrust on all 3 engines.
Reverse worked on engines 2 & 3 but no.1 remained in
forward thrust and accelerated. There was a loss of
directional control and the airplane left the runway to the
right. One passenger suffered a minor injury.
3. The initial cause of the accident was the incomplete
reduction of thrust on the left outer engine at the beginning
of deceleration. This caused the deactivation of the
automatic braking systems and the non-deployment of the
no. 1 thrust reverser. The inadvertent selection of full thrust
on this engine after the landing created high thrust
asymmetry, leading to the runway excursion. The lack of coordination
and of joint control by the crew members, perhaps
aggravated by the presence of third parties in the cockpit,
contributed to the development of this situation.
4. From the data, it appears that, after touchdown, the left
engine throttle lever was advanced in the forward thrust
direction, while the right engine reverser was deployed and
subsequently deactivated. The forward thrust from the left
engine overpowered the brakes, resulting in the airplane
exiting the departure end of the runway at >100 kts.
Additionally, there is no indication on the CVR that the crew
was initiating a go-around. We do not yet have an
explanation as to why the throttle levers would have been
split in this manner (left throttle forward, right throttle
reversed).
5. The airplane went off the side of the runway during a landing
run. At the time of the event, the airport was experiencing
stormy conditions with a high crosswind. The crew
described the approach as challenging but uneventful. No. 4
engine thrust reverser was deactivated and so the crew
decided to use symmetrical reverse thrust (no. 2 & 3 engines
only). Upon landing, the DFDR data show that the no. 4
engine was never brought back to idle. At approximately 70
knots, when the no. 2 and 3 thrust reversers were brought out
of reverse, the data show that the no. 4 engine accelerated
from approx 80% to firewall thrust. The crew reported after
they came to a stop that the no. 4 throttle was in the firewall
position. The maintenance personnel checked the rigging of
the throttle cables and found no defects.
Final Report
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AVIATION COMMITTEE
77
1.18.4. Expert conclusion reached by clinical psychologists based
on records of the psychological examinations of the airplane
captain of the A-310 F-OGYP that was involved in the accident
on July 9, 2006 at Irkutsk airport9
This expert conclusion was performed by independent clinical
psychologists based on records of the psychological examinations of the airplane
captain by a psychologist of the Irkutsk physical evaluation board in 2003 and
2004 as well as a record of the psychological testing of the airplane captain by a
Sibir psychologist (in Moscow) in 2005 and the Captain’s personal
　
中國航空網(wǎng) www.k6050.com
航空翻譯 www.aviation.cn
本文鏈接地址：FINAL REPORT ON THE RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION OF THE ACCI(39)