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the engine control system for the purpose of preventing similar situations in the
future.
Airbus, as was mentioned above, was not involved in the investigation
of this incident. However, they provided the MAK commission investigating the
A-310 F-OGYP fatal accident with the report on the results of their own analysis
of this occurrence. The report states that during the landing run with both
reversers deactivated after an automatic landing had been performed, the
Final Report
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AVIATION COMMITTEE
74
throttles began to increase very slowly (0.1 °/s TRA) from the idle position to
forward thrust direction, which, in conjunction with the automatic spoiler
retraction as per design, prolonged the landing run distance and caused the
airplane to overshoot the runway. The speed of moving the throttles did not
correspond to any speed caused by the automatic thrust function.
2. On March 3, 2004 flight BG 085 flew from Bangkok to Dacca. The
approach to runway 14 at Dacca airport (DAC) was carried out by ILS7.
Autopilots 1 and 2 were switched off at 340 feet. Landing was executed
normally. After compression of the main struts, the spoilers were released. At
the same time, the reverser on the right engine was brought to maximum mode.
The reverse thrust lever of the left engine was not used since the reverser was
deactivated. 1-2 seconds after the RTL of the right engine was brought to
MaxRev, the TCL of the left engine was shifted forward from idle until about 52
degrees according to the FDR. This shift led to the automatic retraction of the
spoilers. Deceleration of the airplane within 15 seconds was done with a
longitudinal load of -0.05 g without the forcible application of brakes by the
crew. After the speed of 100 knots was reached, the crew initiated forcible
deceleration and the longitudinal load increased to -0.3g. As the reverser on the
right engine was being deactivated, the TCL of the left engine was also shifted
forward to "nominal" mode. This led to the sharp turning of the airplane to the
right After about 5 seconds the TCL of the left engine was shifted back to idle
but this did not prevent the airplane from overshooting to the right about 300
meters beyond the end of the runway.
Based on Airbus conclusions, the development of events during this
incident is entirely explicable by the actions of the crew in shifting the TCL and
is not related to the functioning of aviation equipment.
3. On March 8, 2005 an A-310-304 airplane of Mahan Air overran the
runway at Teheran8. According to data from the DFDR, the crew executed an
approach in manual mode. According to information received from the aviation
authorities of Iran who conducted the investigation into this incident, it was the
co-pilot who was actually flying the airplane. He had flown 700 hours on the A-
310 and had a total of 1,100 hours of flight experience. The airplane landed
normally. After compression of the main struts, the spoilers were released. At
the same time the reverser on the left engine was brought to maximum mode.
The reverse thrust lever of the right engine was not used since the reverser was
deactivated. After deceleration to a speed of 80 knots the RTL of the left engine
was brought to the intermediate position between maximum and minimum
reverse thrust. As this was happening the TCL of the right engine was brought
from idle to the position of ~55 degrees according to FDR data. Further
movement of the RTL of the right engine was accompanied by the simultaneous
shifting of the TCL of the left engine practically as far as the nominal mode.
7 Data are taken from the report provided by Airbus
8 Data are taken from the report provided by Airbus
Final Report
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AVIATION COMMITTEE
75
Based on information from the final report about this event, at this moment the
airplane captain interfered in the control, shifted the TCL of the right engine to
idle and again activated maximum reverse of the left engine. However, in spite
of the actions taken, the airplane overshot the runway at a speed of about 40
knots.
Based on Airbus’s conclusion that was agreed with the DGAC, the
development of events during this incident is completely explained by the
actions of the crew in shifting the TCL and is not related to the functioning of
aviation equipment.
Analysis of the last two events shows that shifting to forward thrust of
the TCL of engines whose reverser was deactivated occurred simultaneously
with the shifting of the RTL of the second engine; and in the case of the Iranian
airline, the pilot erroneously moved the TCL nearest him in controlling the RTL
　
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