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the tail section of the cabin was located on the wall on the side of the passenger
cabin. This did not allow flight attendants to quickly fetch it if the need arises.
Analyzing the possible influence of this fact on the effectiveness of actions of
the flight attendants in evacuating passengers after the accident when the
passenger cabin filled with smoke and, consequently, as regards the severity of
the consequences, it should be noted that the existing equipment is used for inflight
firefighting only. there are no procedures or requirements to use it during
an emergency evacuation. The corresponding cabin crew training does not exist.
According to the DOT/FAA/AR-TN99/29 report, the PBE donning time for
cabin attendant ranges from 30 to 60 seconds with an average of 50 seconds.
After donning the PBE, the effective guidance of passengers’ evacuation by
cabin crew becomes more difficult, which may increase the time for smoke
and/or other toxic fumes to affect the passengers. The vision capability and
voice communication may be hampered with PBE on. On the other hand, if
there is no open fire, the use of PBE allows the cabin crew to stay for a longer
time in a smoke-filled compartment (the actual duration of the emergency
evacuation on the accident flight was estimated to be 60-70 seconds) and afford
help to any passengers that are weakened by carbon monoxide or other toxic
fumes. Thus, it was impossible to determine for sure the possible influence of
the absence of PBE equipment on the effectiveness of cabin crew’s actions or
the severity of the consequences. The Commission has drafted a safety
recommendation on the necessity of providing protective equipment to
passengers and crew members for use during an emergency evacuation in
smoke-filled conditions.
Final Report
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AVIATION COMMITTEE
109
3. Findings and Conclusion
3.1. The ATC service provided met the requirements of the applicable
standard documents.
3.2. The meteorological service provided met the requirements of the
applicable standard documents. At the time of the accident, the
weather conditions did not hamper the safety of carrying out a
landing on runway 30 at Irkutsk airport.
3.3. The available landing distance on runway 30 at Irkutsk airport
amounted to 2425 m and ensured the safe landing of the А-310
airplane under the actual conditions.
The friction coefficient of the runway measured by the airport
authorities in accordance with civilian airport operations guideline
RF-94 and the braking characteristics on a runway declared on this
basis (braking action good), were given to the crew via ATIS Mike.
The investigations carried out show that the actual braking conditions
at Irkutsk airport for at least the last 2/3 of the runway corresponded
to the conditions for a runway “covered with water” and was one of
the factors that influenced the deceleration rate and speed value at the
runway excursion moment, given the actual crew actions and
airplane movement parameters.
3.4. On its last flight on July 8, 2006, the airplane was released with 6
defects as per MEL, including the deactivated state of the left engine
thrust reverser. The previous two flights had been carried out with a
deactivated right engine thrust reverser.
A comparison of the applications for consumable materials and spare
parts for A-310 aircraft with their actual availability in Sibir’s
warehouses showed that the reserve stock held in storage satisfied
25%-30% of the demand. The difficulties involved in the customs
clearance of spare parts imported from abroad in circumstances
requiring the urgent correction of faults (within 10 days) resulted in
the universal practice of operating flights with defects being deferred
for long periods. There was no effective monitoring of the dynamics
of using the MEL. There were no trends towards any reduction in the
recurrence of such negative factors. In the first half of 2006, there
were 86 extensions of deferred defects on A-310 airplane (over and
above the periods laid down in the MEL), which, together with the
recurring breakdowns, testify to substantial shortcomings in the
maintenance of A-310 airplane at Sibir.
3.5. All airplane and engine systems aboard the A-310 F-OGYP, apart
from the defects deferred according to the MEL, were in working
Final Report
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AVIATION COMMITTEE
110
order on departure from Moscow. According to the results of the
investigations carried out, the Commission did not detect any signs
of any breakdowns of any aircraft or engine systems on the last flight
until the time of collision with the barriers on the ground, apart from
　
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