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automatic brake system in LOW mode (ensuring deceleration with continuous
slowdown -1.7 m/s2).
Note: According to the results of a simulation, it was
established that the thrust of both engines as recorded
by the FDR during the airplane’s landing run on the
runway corresponds to that calculated for the
recorded position of the TCL/RTL and the actual
conditions at Irkutsk airport. The airplane’s progress
along the runway was fully determined by movements
of the TCL and the flight surface controls, as well as
the engine operation modes selected by the crew. The
airplane’s aerodynamic and thrust parameters
matched those of the airplane type. There was no
influence on the airplane by any hazardous external
factors (wind displacement etc).
Any movement of the TCL for the left engine to a position greater than 10º,
in accordance with work-inherent logic, caused the automatic retraction of the
spoilers, which coincided with the time maximum thrust was reached by the
thrust reverser on the right engine. Retraction of the spoilers led to the
deactivation of the automatic braking mode.
Note: In violation of SOP’s, the co-pilot failed to report the
deactivation of the automatic braking mode.
At this time the speed was about 180 kph (98 knots) and, on account of the
large asymmetry of engine thrust, the airplane started to turn to the right, which
the airplane captain counteracted by depressing the left pedal from the 0º
position to -30º (limit) and forcibly applying the brakes. The CVR recorded
twice, at 22:43:55 and at 22:44:00, information from the airplane captain about
his forcible braking of the wheels. The depression of the brake pedals was 14°,
which was the structural limit. Analysis of prior flights has shown that the
average depression of brake pedals during a landing run was 3°-5°. Deactivation
of the automatic brake mode, retraction of the spoilers and the increase in the
work mode of the left engine to forward thrust decreased the deceleration rate to
1 m/s2.
After the accident pieces of rubber from the destroyed wheel tire protector
on the right landing gear bogie were found on the right side of the runway, at a
Final Report
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AVIATION COMMITTEE
101
distance of 1340 - 1860 m from the offset threshold of runway 30. The location
of the pieces of rubber corresponds to the stage at which the crew applied the
brakes, using the pedals, at a speed of 170-165 kph (92-89 knots).
Note: Investigations have shown that the destruction of one
tire protector on the right main landing gear bogie did
not affect the braking effectiveness of the bogie as a
whole. It should also be noted that the MMEL (section
01-32) permits the take-off of an airplane even if the
brake of one wheel on each landing gear bogie is not
functioning.
It was not possible to establish the exact cause of the
destruction of the tire protector. Investigation revealed
that the anti-skid system worked properly during the
landing run.
At 22:44:01 the thrust reverser doors of engine no. 2 were in the
intermediate position for 2 seconds, after which they switched over to the
deactivated position, and they remained in this position until the end of the
recording.
Starting from 22:44:05 and for 10 seconds the position of the TCL of the
left engine decreased from 26º to 22º TLA. The thrust changed from 1.211 units
to 1.16 - 1.17 units and was constant up to the end of the recording.
The minimum air speed during the landing run from 22:44:00 – 22:44:05
was 165 kph (89 knots), after which it started to increase. From that moment the
crew had to start the active work to diagnose the situation when the role of the
co-pilot in monitoring the engine speed and work parameters is paramount.
Note: Sibir’s А-310 SOP stipulated that the co-pilot must
continuously monitor the engine parameters (EGT, N1) as
well as the speed of movement of the airplane during a
landing run.
An analysis of the work of crew members shows that, at least
before 22:44:15, the airplane captain’s right hand was on
the engine control module, that is, only the co-pilot could
have manipulated the ECAM control panel and, until then,
he could not have seen the position of the TCL for the left
engine, as it was covered by the airplane captain’s hand.
Therefore, the crew members, particularly the co-pilot, failed to exercise
appropriate control over the working parameters of the engines and the
airplane's speed during the landing run.
Final Report
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AVIATION COMMITTEE
　
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