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TAKEOFF The flight crew calls out “THRUST SET” before reaching N1 value Engine check not valid  Refer to NO-050 Takeoff Roll
CLIMB / DESC The flight crew uses the V/S knob without setting a target Climb or descent does not stop  
DESC In managed descent,
the flight crew uses the speed brakes, in an attempt to descend below the computed profile Unless the aircraft is above the computed profile, the autothrust increases thrust to remain on the computed profile. The expected increased rate of descent will not be reached. In addition, fuel consumption will increase  Refer to NO-080 GUIDANCE AND MONITORING
DESC The flight crew does not set the TERR ON ND switch to ON Reduced situational awareness  Refer to NO-080 PREFACE
APPR The flight crew activates approach phase without crosschecking with each other The other flight crewmember may perceive the speed change as undue, and may react to it  Refer to NO-010 Communication
APPR The flight crew clears the F-PLN using the DIR TO or DIR TO RAD IN functions, although the aircraft is in radar vectoring NAV mode is armed. If this mode setting is not relevant, it may lead to an erroneous trajectory  Refer to NO-100 initial approach and Refer to NO-100 intermediate approach
APPR The flight crew does not sufficiently monitor raw data Any erroneous computation leads to an erroneous trajectory  Refer to NO-100 final approach
Refer to NO-120 final approach
To be continued on next page
 
PREVENTING IDENTIFIED RISKS
PREVENTING IDENTIFIED RISKS
 
Continued from previous page
Flight Phase Risk Consequences Refer to FCTM
ILS APPR Glide slope interception from above: G/S not rearmed The aircraft descends through the glide slope axis, without intercepting it  Refer to NO-110 final approach
NPA APPR When the aircraft reaches the minimum altitude, the flight crew sets the bird to ON and the AP to OFF, but does not set the FDs to OFF. The FDs orders may not be correct below the minima.  Refer to OP-030 Autopilot/ Flight Director
Refer to NO-120 reaching the minima

SYSTEM OPERATIONS / FAILURES
Applicable to: ALL

ATA Risk Consequences Csqce type Refer to FCTM
22 The flight crew
uses the instinctive
disconnect pushbutton
on the thrust levers
to disconnect autothrust,
without reducing the
Throttle Lever Angle (TLA) Immediate and undue speed increase  Refer to OP-030
AUTOTHRUST (A/THR)
22 Alpha floor/TOGA LOCK, with no disconnection of autothrust TOGA thrust is maintained, with an
undue speed increase, and may lead to overspeed  Refer to OP-030
　
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本文鏈接地址：A330/A340 機組訓練手冊 FCTM Flight Crew Training Manual 2(78)