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standards (separation minima) have been in place for decades. Until recently, there were
few efforts to change these standards, perhaps because it was felt that the current
standards were adequate and a rigorous analysis of the impact of changing the standards
would be a major undertaking. The current standards are based on radar separation.
There is very little official documentation on the historical development of these standards,
but it appears that they were set in large part by a consideration of the ability to maintain
separate images of aircraft on radar screens, with additional separation added as a safety
margin. Certainly, there is no official indication that mathematical/probabilistic models
were developed to aid in the setting of separation standards that would be maintained by
radar surveillance. On the other, hand mathematical/probabilistic models have been used
for quite some time in the setting of separation standards in oceanic airspace. Most
recently they have played a part in the decision to reduce vertical separation standards
from 2,000 ft. to 1,000 ft. in portions of the airspace over the North Atlantic. This paper
describes the beginnings of an attempt to create a model for use in airspace where radar
separation is provided, one that will enable the estimation of the risk of a midair collision
or other safety problem (e.g., serious wake vortex encounter) as a function of parameters
such as separation minima, accuracy of position information, integrity of systems, and
controller automation aids.
1.2 SCOPE OF JOINT ACTIVITIES
The present effort is the result of an action plan for an FAA/EUROCONTROL
cooperative effort on air traffic modeling for separation standards. This plan was signed
by Mr. Norman Fujisaki, Director of Investment Analysis and Operations Research,
Federal Aviation Administration and Mr. Alex Hendriks, Head of the Airspace and
Navigation Division, EUROCONTROL. This is one of a number of cooperative action
plans sponsored by the FAA/EUROCONTROL Research and Development Committee.
Two teams (North American and European) were formed to carry out the objectives of
the action plan. Both teams consisted of volunteers interested in the subject. The scope
of the teams’ activities were defined by the action plan presented below.
SEPARATION SAFETY MODELING
1-2
ACTION PLAN FOR FAA/EUROCONTROL COOPERATIVE EFFORT
ON
AIR TRAFFIC MODELING FOR SEPARATION STANDARDS
I. TASK OBJECTIVE:
A. To foster worldwide cooperation on Air Traffic Modeling for separation
standards and the joint development and use of these capabilities to support
the efforts in operational concepts, procedure development, and system
architecture.
B. To initially focus on an area of mutual need - the development of common
models for safety analysis, especially in the areas of separation standards
and collision risk.
II. BACKGROUND:
A. The joint perspective is that several questions arise with the advent of
various new technologies such as SATNAV, Flight Management Systems
and data link, and the new emphasis on User Preferred Routings either as a
contract or in Free Flight. Chief among the questions is the safe reduction of
separation standards. Couple this quest with the relaxation of assigned
directional altitudes to the ultimate - cruise climb - and collision risk
becomes a significant analytic requirement. Add to this new automation
techniques to aid the controller and safety prediction becomes an important
consideration. All these are areas where significant improvements need to
be made to validate capabilities and speed implementation.
1. Separation Standards. Although considerable analysis has gone into
oceanic separation standards; domestic standards have evolved
more through history than science. Advances in navigation,
communication and surveillance technologies, and recent proposals
for new operational concepts, have been met with calls to revisit
and reduce separation standards. To do this, a consistent
acceptable method for ascertaining safety related to separation must
be developed and applied.
2. Collision Risk. Moves to reduce horizontal separations on
approach run full up against an inability to ascertain collision risk.
The probability of pilot/aircraft deviation in such a situation are not
well understood since they are rare events and there has not been a
concerted effort to ascertain what this probability might be.
3. Controller Aids. Finally, many of the new automation systems are
meant to improve the controller’s productivity and assert that they
also improve safety. There is currently no uniform way to predict
safety implications of technology. This area of investigation would
　
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