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does affect risk of collision. TCAS II is required on all part 121
SEPARATION SAFETY MODELING
A-12
aircraft with more than 30 passenger seats. TCAS I, a less
sophisticated system is required on air carriers with 30 seats or
fewer.]
iv. Advanced TCAS/ACAS, such as TCAS IV
[A proposed system that would provide better sensor (intruder
azimuth and range) data and horizontal, as well as vertical
resolution advisories.]
v. Automatic dependent surveillance (ADS)
[Provides an automatic data link transmission of current aircraft
state (position, velocity, etc.) information to air traffic control via
satellite. Standards for a second form of ADS, the broadcast ADS,
or ADS-B, are being developed by RTCA SC-186 and EUROCAE.
ADS-B will permit broadcast of state data to nearby aircraft as
well as ground stations. Intent information may also be provided.]
vi. Cockpit display of aircraft traffic information (CDTI)
[These concepts and standards are being developed to provide the
display of "other traffic" information to the flight crew. Two
methods of obtaining traffic data for CDTI have been proposed:
the use of an ADS-B system for direct aircraft-to-aircraft data link,
and the use of a Traffic Information Service (TIS) ground-to-air
data link to broadcast radar track data for proximate aircraft.]
[vii. Remarks
1) The concept of required monitoring performance has been
chartered to SC-186 to determine the accuracy, latency,
integrity, and availability requirements and available
performance for maneuvering aircraft flying in different ATC
environments.
2) Other future concepts for airplane system developments include
provisions for airborne conflict probe and conflict resolution
systems.]
e. Backup systems and procedures
E. Ground/satellite systems: surveillance and navigation
1. Surveillance capability
a. Procedural dependent surveillance
i. Content of pilot position reports
ii. Reporting intervals
b. Automatic dependent surveillance (ADS)
i. Basic update rate
ii. Display accuracy; controller display target position error
iii. ADS contracts (e.g., increased reporting rate by triggering events)
iv. Sensor accuracy
v. System reliability
vi. System availability
vii. End-to-end communications time capabilities
APPENDIX A
FACTORS POTENTIALLY AFFECTING SEPARATION SAFETY
A-13
viii. System coverage
c. Independent surveillance (radar)
i. Type of sensor (primary or secondary)
ii. Coverage area
iii. Processing and associated delays
iv. Accuracy of measured position after processing
1) Radar registration error (MOSAIC)
2) Slant-range error for non-mode C equipped aircraft
v. Update rate
vi. Display accuracy (error)
vii. System reliability.
viii. System availability
ix. Backup systems
2. Performance
a. Accuracy
i. Automation-induced errors
b. Reliability/availability
c. Integrity
i. Automation-induced errors
ii. False positives
iii. Missed events
d. Equipment outage
i. Backup systems, including power
[Unfortunately, backup systems, including power systems, have
occasionally failed. If separation minima are reduced, backup
systems play an especially critical role for, in their, absence there
may not be time to depend solely on backup procedures or
“kluged” work-arounds before a collision occurs.]
1) Availability
2) Reliability
3) Integrity
ii. Backup procedures
e. External interference
i. Natural
ii. Human
1) Sabotage
2) Spoofing
3) Jamming
f. Processing, data transmission, and associated delays (e.g., delay between
acquisition of a signal and the display of the information)
F. Human performance
1. Flight crew performance/skill
a. Monitoring/situational awareness
SEPARATION SAFETY MODELING
A-14
[In everyday parlance, situation awareness refers to the up-to-theminute
cognizance required to operate or maintain a system. Because
the concept involves tracking processes or events in time, it can also
be described as mental bookkeeping¾ keeping track of multiple
threads of different but interacting sub-problems as well as the
influences of the activities undertaken to control them. Breakdowns in
situation awareness can lead to operational difficulties in handling the
demands of a dynamic, event-driven environment. In aviation circles,
this is known as “falling behind the plane.” Situation awareness is
generally most in jeopardy during periods of rapid change and where
the confluence of forces make an already complex situation even more
　
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