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assessment on Airbus A330 of the C16195BA standard. The first batch of C16195BA Pitot
probes had been received one week before the F-GZCP accident.
1.18.3 Testimony of crews in flight in the vicinity of the accident zone
In order to more closely determine the environment of flight AF447, the BEA made a list of
flights close to airway UN 873 during the night of 31 May to 1st June 2009 and asked crews
for testimony. Not all of the information requested has been received at present. The
testimony summarised hereafter is representative of the information already analyzed.
Flight IB6024
Flight IB6024 (Airbus A340) passed at the level of the ORARO waypoint at FL370
approximately twelve minutes after AF447.
The crew saw AF447 take off while taxiing at Rio de Janeiro. When passing the INTOL
waypoint, they encountered conditions typical of the inter-tropical convergence zone. These
conditions were particularly severe 70 NM to 30 NM before the TASIL waypoint. They moved
away from the route by about 30 NM to the east to avoid cumulonimbus formations with a
significant vertical development, and then returned to the airway in clear skies close to the
TASIL waypoint. The crew reported they had difficulties communicating with Dakar ATC.
20 It was this type of probe, then produced by Sextant, that was installed on Air France’s aircraft on the
date of the event.
66
Flight AF459
Flight AF459 (Airbus A330-203) passed at the level of the ORARO waypoint approximately
37 minutes after l’AF447.
The sky was clear but the half-moon, visible to the aft left of the aircraft, did not make it
possible to see the contour of the cloud mass distinctly. After flying through a turbulent zone
in the head of a cumulus congestus formation at the level of NATAL, without having detected
this zone on the radar, he selected gain in MAX mode. At about 2 h 00, he observed a first
echo that differed significantly depending on whether the radar’s gain was in CAL or MAX
mode. The TILT was set between -1° and 1.5°. He decided to take evasive action to the
west, which resulted in a deviation of 20 NM to the left of the route. During this evasive
action, a vast squall line with an estimated length of 150 NM appeared on the screen, which
was set to a scale of 160 NM. The echoes were yellow and red when the radar was set with
gain on the MAX position and green and yellow when the gain was on the CAL position. No
lightning was observed.
ATLANTICO control, informed by the crew of their decision to avoid this squall line by taking
evasive action to the east, asked them to return to the airway as soon as they could. This
evasive action meant the aircraft flew between 70 and 80 NM to the right of the planned
route. In addition, the crew was authorised to climb from FL350 to FL370.
On leaving the ATLANTICO FIR, through the TASIL waypoint, the crew attempted in vain to
contact Dakar control in HF on the 5565 KHz and 6535 KHz frequencies, and on the other
HF frequencies given in the on-board documentation. Likewise, the attempted ADS-C
connection was unfruitful.
The crew returned to the airway around the ASEBA waypoint, that is to say more than 28
minutes after the first theoretical contact with Dakar control. They reported slight turbulence
on the edge of the convective zone.
Radio contact was established with Dakar control at about 3 h 45, close to the SAGMA
waypoint. The SELCAL test was performed and the controller asked the crew to try to
contact AF447. Several attempts were made on various HF frequencies, and then on 121.5
MHz and 123.45 MHz, without any success.
Flight LH507
Flight LH507 (B747-400) preceded flight AF447 by about twenty minutes at FL350.
The crew reported that it flew at the upper limit of the cloud layer and then in the clouds in
the region of ORARO. In this zone they saw green echoes on the radar on their path, which
they avoided by changing their route by about ten nautical miles to the west. While flying
through this zone, which took about fifteen minutes, they felt moderate turbulence and did
not observe any lightning. They lowered their speed to the speed recommended in turbulent
zones. They saw bright St Elmo’s fire on the windshield on the left-hand side. The crew
listened into the 121.5 MHz frequency throughout the flight without hearing any message
from AF447.
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1.18.4 Procedures to be applied in case an unreliable speed indication is detected
On the date of the accident, the operator’s procedures mention that the following actions
must be carried out from memory by the crew when they have any doubt concerning the
reliability of a speed indication and when control of the flight is “affected dangerously”:
　
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