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obtain the legal time applicable in metropolitan France on the day of the incident. The estimated time
of the accident is based on the interruption in the ACARS messages.
8
ORGANISATION OF THE INVESTIGATION
On Monday 1st June 2009 at around 7 h 45, the BEA was alerted by the Air France
Operations Coordination Centre, which had received no news from flight AF447 between Rio
de Janeiro Galeão (Brazil) and Paris Charles de Gaulle. After having established without
doubt that the airplane had disappeared in international waters and in accordance with
Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation and to the French Civil Aviation
Code (Book VII), the BEA launched a technical investigation and a team was formed to
conduct it.
In accordance with the provisions of Annex 13, Brazilian, American, British and German
accredited representatives were associated with the investigation as the State of the engine
manufacturer (NTSB) and because they were able to supply essential information to the
investigation (CENIPA, AAIB and BFU). The following countries also nominated observers as
some of their citizens were among the dead:
• China,
• Croatia,
• Hungary,
• Korea,
• Ireland,
• Italy,
• Lebanon,
• Morocco,
• Norway,
• Russia,
• South Africa,
• Switzerland.
The Investigator-in-Charge initially set up four working groups to determine and gather the
information required for the investigation in the following areas:
• Sea searches,
• Maintenance,
• Operations,
• Systems and equipment.
Investigation teams have also been sent to Brazil, Senegal and to sea, in the area where the
airplane disappeared.
All of the operations that have been undertaken on the site or on the airplane parts have
been coordinated with those responsible for the judicial investigation.
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1. FACTUAL INFORMATION
1.1 History of Flight
On Sunday 31 May 2009, the Airbus A330-203 registered F-GZCP operated by Air France
was programmed to perform scheduled flight AF447 between Rio de Janeiro Galeão and
Paris Charles de Gaulle. Twelve crew members (3 flight crew, 9 cabin crew) and 216
passengers were on board. The departure was planned for 22 h 00.
Towards 22 h 10, the crew was cleared to start up engines and leave its parking position.
Takeoff took place at 22 h 29.
The takeoff weight was de 232.8t (for a MTOW of 233 t), including 70.4 tonnes of fuel.
The crew contacted, successively:
• RIO DE JANEIRO approach control,
• the CURITIBA ATC centre, which cleared it to climb to FL350 at 22 h 45 min 26 s,
• the BRASILIA ATC centre at 22 h 55 min 41 s,
• the RECIFE ATC centre at 23 h 19 min 27 s, the airplane being stable at FL350,
• the ATLANTICO ATC centre on HF at 1 h 33 min 25 s.
At 1 h 35 min 15 s, the crew informed the ATLANTICO controller that they had passed the
INTOL2 point then announced the following estimated times: SALPU at 1 h 48 min then
ORARO at 2 h 00. They also transmitted their SELCAL code and a test was performed.
At 1 h 35 min 46 s, the controller asked them to maintain FL350 and to give their estimated
time at the TASIL point.
Between 1 h 35 min 53 s and 1 h 36 min 14 s, the controller asked the crew three times for
its estimated time at the TASIL point. There was no further contact with the crew.
2INTOL, SALPU, ORARO and TASIL are civil aviation reporting points.
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1.2 Killed and Injured
Injuries
Crew Members
Passengers
Others
Fatal
12
216 (3)
0
Serious
0
0
0
Light/none
0
0
0
1.3 Damage to Aircraft
Between 6 and 20 June 2009, numerous airplane parts were recovered from the sea.
(3) Including one baby.
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1.4 Other Damage
Not applicable.
1.5 Personnel Information
Given the length of the planned flight and in compliance with the Air France operations
manual and with the regulations in force, the flight crew was reinforced.
The regulation defines reinforced crew as follows:
Flight crew where the number of members is greater than the minimum number required for
the operation of the airplane and within which each member of the flight crew is able to leave
his or her station and be replaced by another member of the flight crew with the appropriate
qualification (4).
The airline’s procedures (5) specify that to be a back-up duty pilot, a crew member must have
the same rating as the crew member that he or she is backing up and, in addition, during the
captain’s rest period, a pilot with the same license as the captain must be at the controls.
　
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