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Note: The FMS prediction do not take into account the slat or flap failures. Since fuel
consumption is increased, these predictions are not valid.
FAILURE AT TAKEOFF
Should a flap/slat retraction problem occur at takeoff, the crew will PULL the speed knob for
selected speed to stop the acceleration and avoid exceeding VFE. The overspeed warning is
computed according to the actual slats/flaps position.
The landing distance available at the departure airport and the aircraft gross weight will determine
the crew’s next course of action.
FAILURE DURING THE APPROACH
The detection of a slat or flap failure occurs with the selection of flap lever during the approach.
With A/THR operative, the managed speed target will become the next manoeuvring characteristic
speed e.g. S speed when selecting flap lever to 1.
At this stage, if a slat or flap failure occurs, the crew will:
• Pull the speed knob for selected speed to avoid further deceleration
• Delay the approach to complete the ECAM procedure
• Refer to LANDING WITH FLAPS OR SLATS JAMMED paper check list.
• Update the approach briefing
In the QRH, the line, "SPEED SEL..........VFE NEXT -5 kt" is designed to allow the crew to
configure the aircraft for landing whilst controlling the speed in a safe manner. This procedure
A330/A340 FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL
ABNORMAL OPERATIONS
FLIGHT CONTROLS
A330/A340 FLEET AO-027 P 2/6
FCTM 17 JUN 09
may involve reducing speed below the manoeuvring speed for the current configuration which is
acceptable provided the speed is kept above VLS. The speed reduction and configuration changes
should preferably be carried out wings level.
The landing distance factors and approach speed increments are available in the QRH. Refer to
AO-010 LANDING DISTANCE PROC.
Assuming VLS is displayed on the PFD, VAPP should be close to VLS + wind correction, since
this speed is computed on the actual slat/flap position.
The AP may be used down to 500 ft AGL. As the AP is not tuned for the abnormal configurations,
its behaviour can be less than optimum and must be monitored.
During the approach briefing, emphasis should be made of:
• Tail strike awareness
• The go-around configuration
• Any deviation from standard call out
• The speeds to be flown, following a missed approach
• At the acceleration altitude, selected speed must be used to control the acceleration to the
required speed for the configuration.
Consider the fuel available and the increased consumption associated with a diversion when
flying with flaps and/or slats jammed. Additionally, when diverting with flaps/slats extended, cruise
altitude is limited 20 000 ft.
NO FLAPS NO SLATS LANDING
Some items in the QRH "NO FLAPS NO SLATS LANDING" checklist need to be highlighted:
• More distance is required for manoeuvring.
• The flap handle should be placed into CONF 1 position as required by the QRH to enable the
SRS mode in the event of a go-around. VFE displayed on the PFD depends on the flap lever
position, so a false VFE will be given.
• Disregard the CONF 2 requirement on the ECAM the status page.
• Autopilot is allowed down to 500 ft AGL.
• At 500 ft, reduce speed to obtain VLS -5 kt (or VREF +45 kt, if VLS not available) at touchdown
for performance considerations.
• During the approach the aircraft pitch attitude will be high, increasing the risk of a tail strike on
touchdown. Consequently, only a small pitch adjustment is required in the flare to reduce the
rate of descent prior to a positive touchdown.
• Due to the high touchdown speed, a prolonged float should be avoided
• Braking considerations apply, Refer to NO-160 BRAKING.
The NO FLAPS NO SLATS LANDING is classified as an extremely improbable failure. It is the
reason why the corresponding procedure is not related on ECAM but only on the paper C/L.
A330/A340 FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL
ABNORMAL OPERATIONS
FLIGHT CONTROLS
A330/A340 FLEET AO-027 P 3/6
FCTM 17 JUN 09
ELEVATOR REDUNDANCY LOST
Applicable to: ALL
INTRODUCTION
Each ailerons and each elevators are hydraulically powered either by the Green or the Blue or
the Yellow circuit and are controlled either by the PRIM or the SEC. This architecture, detailed in
QRH /OPS DATA, provides a high level of redundancy.
However, a combination of three failures affecting flight control computers and/or servocontrol
and/or hydraulic might lead to the loss of several ailerons and one or both elevators
simultaneously. Although the aircraft can be flown in such a configuration, the F/CTL ELEV
REDUND LOST procedure (triggered in case of dual failures case) has been developed to
　
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