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certain. Because people are fairly agile and the fact that the falling machine gives a little warning that it is
falling, death is not likely.”
Consider factors other than injuries. “We identified several equipment and facility items at risk. Most of
these we have guarded, but some are still vulnerable. If the machine falls nobody can do any thing to
protect these items. It would take a couple of days at least to get us back in full production.”
FAA System Safety Handbook, Appendix F
December 30, 2000
F-43
Refer to the matrix (see Figure 2.1A). “Let’s see, any injury is likely to be severe, but a fatality is not
very probable, property damage could be expensive and could cost us a lot of production time.
Considering both factors, I think that critical is the best choice.”
Combine probability and severity in the matrix. The thinking process should be as follows:
The probability category occasional is in the middle of the matrix (refer to the matrix below). I go down
until it meets the critical category coming from the left side. The result is a high rating. I notice that it is
among the lower high ratings but it is still high.”
Figure 2.1A Risk Assessment Matrix
Probability
Frequent Likely Occasional Seldom Unlikely
I
II
III
IV
Catastrophic
Critical
Moderate
Negligible
A B C D E
SEVERITY
Extremely
High Medium
Low
Medium
Extremely
High High
Risk Levels
Limitations and concerns with the use of the matrix. As you followed the scenario above, you may have
noted that there are some problems involved in using the matrix. These include the following:
Subjectivity. There are at least two dimensions of subjectivity involved in the use of the matrix. The first
is in the interpretation of the matrix categories. Your interpretation of the term “critical” may be quite
different from mine. The second is in the interpretation of the risk. If a few weeks ago I saw a machine
much like the one to be moved fall over and crush a person to death, I might have a greater tendency to
rate both the probability and severity higher than someone who did not have such an experience. If time
and resources permit, averaging the rating of several can reduce this variation
personnel.
Inconsistency. The subjectivity described above naturally leads to some inconsistency. A risk rated very
high in one organization may only have a high rating in another. This becomes a real problem if the two
risks are competing for a limited pot of risk control resources (as they always are). There will be real
motivation to inflate risk assessments to enhance competitiveness for limited resources.
FAA System Safety Handbook, Appendix F
December 30, 2000
F-44
3.0 RISK CONTROL OPTION ANALYSIS TOOLS, DETAILS, AND EXAMPLES
3.1 BASIC RISK CONTROL OPTIONS
Major risk control options and examples of each are as follows:
Reject a risk. We can and should refuse to take a risk if the overall costs of the risk exceed its benefits.
For example, planner may review the risks associated with a specific particular operation or task. After
assessing all the advantages and evaluating the increased risk associated with it, even after application of
all available risk controls, he decides the benefits do not outweigh the expected risk costs and it is better
off in the long run not doing the operation or task.
Avoiding risk altogether requires canceling or delaying the job, or operation, but is an option that is
rarely exercised due to operational importance. However, it may be possible to avoid specific risks: risks
associated with a night operation may be avoided by planning the operation for daytime, likewise
thunderstorms can be avoided by changing the route of flight.
Delaying a risk. It may be possible to delay a risk. If there is no time deadline or other operational benefit
to speedy accomplishment of a risky task, then it is often desirable delay the acceptance of the risk.
During the delay, the situation may change and the requirement to accept the risk may go away. During
the delay additional risk control options may become available for one reason or another (resources
become available, new technology becomes available, etc.) thereby reducing the overall risk.
Risk transference does not change probability or severity of the risk, but it may decrease the probability
or severity of the risk actually experienced by the individual or organization accomplishing the activity.
As a minimum, the risk to the original individual or organization is greatly decreased or eliminated
because the possible losses or costs are shifted to another entity.
Risk is commonly spread out by either increasing the exposure distance or by lengthening the time
　
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